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FOREWORD
The Combat Poverty Agency is a statutory advisory body which works for
the prevention and elimination of poverty and social exclusion in Ireland.
Central to this is the distribution of resources, services and employment
opportunities in favour of people living in poverty. Combat Poverty aims to
advance this in a variety of ways, including through research and public
education. This report aims to contribute to this work by informing the
debate about the nature and future direction of the Irish welfare system. 
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
Ireland has a relatively low rate of social expenditure for a variety of
historical reasons, including the influence of the British welfare model.
Social expenditure refers not just to social welfare payments or income
support, but also to expenditure on other social areas such as health and
education. In considering how the social welfare system might be
reshaped to meet new challenges and further reduce poverty there are a
number of important considerations. These include issues such as the
following: How are the tax and welfare systems structured and how do
they interact? What are the material and social needs of people living in
poverty and how can these best be met? What types of service provision
will promote both economic and social objectives? How can the quality of
life for welfare recipients be improved and new opportunities opened up
for them? Some of these questions are addressed in this report.
The reduction of poverty is most effectively achieved through a
combination of productionist (economic), welfarist and community based
approaches, and the achievement of synergies between these. The
interdependence between economic growth, employment and social
cohesion was recognised by the European Union at the Lisbon summit.
Ireland’s economy has undergone a dramatic transformation in the last
decade. This transformation has been well analysed in the academic and
policy literature. However, the evolution of the social welfare system, and
how it has been impacted by the economic transformation, has received
less attention. Given the more straitened economic circumstances now
facing Ireland, the era of dramatic increases in social expenditure would
appear to be over, and issues of efficiency and of value-for-money have
come to the fore. This necessitates the adoption of a strategic and
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integrated vision for the evolution of the social expenditure system. 
There is widespread consensus that provision by the state of social
welfare, and high quality, efficiently delivered social services have key
roles to play in poverty reduction. The social welfare system provides the
main source of income support to those who are unable to participate in
the labour market and supplements the wages of those on low incomes.
The poorest 30 per cent of Irish households have virtually no income from
economic activity. Welfare payments bring their share of pre-tax incomes
up from under 1 per cent to about 8 per cent.1 The welfare system also
has an important function in helping those who are unemployed back to
work and consequently an important role in economic development. 
Economic development and social development are often viewed as
being in competition, but there are significant complementarities between
the two. For example, investment in housing contributes to the development
of human capital, in the form of a healthier and more productive
workforce.2 More socially cohesive societies have lower crime rates and this
offsets the necessity of other expenditure.3 The Combat Poverty Agency also
supports redistribution of income on social justice and equity grounds. 
While Ireland has converged on, or overtaken, many of the European
Union states economically, substantial infrastructural and social deficits
remain and these in turn have substantial economic costs which may
block further development. This raises the question of what type of social
expenditure system Ireland now needs or requires. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The report has a variety of objectives. It aims to provide a resource for
researchers and policy makers on the Irish social welfare system. It also
aims to contribute to the debate about how the Irish social expenditure
system might evolve, and to inform future Irish National Action Plans
against Poverty and Social Exclusion (NAPs incl.), which are submitted to
the European Commission and annual budgets. These plans have as one
of their four objectives ‘to facilitate participation in employment and
access to resources, rights, goods and services.’
1 Brian Nolan, Bertrand Maître, Donal O’Neill and Olive Sweetman, The Distribution of
Income in Ireland (Dublin, Oak Tree Press: 2000). 
2 Gary S. Becker, Human Capital (Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 1993). 
3 Ivana Bacik et al., ‘Crime and Poverty in Dublin: an analysis of the association between
community deprivation, District Court appearance and sentence severity’ in Ivana Bacik
and Michael O’Connell (eds.) Crime and Poverty in Ireland (Dublin: Round Hall Sweet
and Maxwell, 1998). 
This study, which is based on published international reports, analysis
of social expenditure in select countries and policy reviews: 
• defines social expenditure and key related terms, and provides an
overview and comparison of different policy instruments 
• provides a better understanding of why Ireland has, historically, had
a relatively low level of social expenditure
• places this analysis in context by comparing spending patterns in
Ireland with those of other industrial countries
• provides a detailed analysis and description of key areas of social
expenditure in old age, health, unemployment, active labour market
supports and children
• provides data and context to make informed choices about the
appropriate size and nature of the social welfare system given
Ireland’s changed economic circumstances, i.e. both its greater
prosperity and recent economic slowdown.
KEY FINDINGS
Ireland has traditionally had a relatively low level of social expenditure as
a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP).4 The report notes that of
15 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries in 1997, Ireland had the fourth lowest net total social
expenditure after Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand.5
Total social security contributions in Ireland amounted to just under 13
per cent of total taxation in 1997, compared with an EU average of nearly
29 per cent. The Irish tax and social expenditure system could therefore be
characterised as a ‘low tax, low spend’ system and consequently the level
of redistribution achieved through the system is also relatively low.6
There are, however, exceptions to this general characterisation. For
example, the report shows that spending on sickness, health care and
Foreword
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4 For most developed economies GDP is thought to be a better measure of wealth than
GNP, but the level of social expenditure is low in Ireland even using GNP, as the report
shows.
5 However, this may be partly offset by voluntary private social benefits. Japan and South
Korea are countries where welfare provision is substantially delivered through private
firms. 
6 Eithne Fitzgerald, ‘Redistibution through Ireland’s Welfare and Tax Systems’ in Sara
Cantillon, Carmel Corrigan, Peadar Kirby and Joan O’Flynn (eds.), Rich and Poor:
Perspectives on Tackling Inequality in Ireland (Dublin, Oak Tree Press: 2001). 
The tax base also tends to be wider, however, as social contributions are not deductible
from the income tax base, for example (Cathal O’Donoghue, ‘Redistributive Forces in
the Irish Tax-Benefit System’, mimeo, 2001).
disability in Ireland is the second highest in the EU as a proportion of
GDP. The report identifies the next biggest ‘priority areas’ of social
expenditure in Ireland as ‘families and children’ and unemployment
related social protection. 
Dr Timonen argues in this report that, as a proportion of government
expenditure, social spending has the highest priority in the OECD. This
pattern is also seen in Ireland, where social spending as a proportion of
GDP remained constant from 1984 to 1997, but non-social expenditure
fell by 14.5 per cent as a percentage of GDP during the period. However,
the seeming constancy in social expenditure masks a number of trends.
The proportion of social spending spent on welfare fell from a peak of
14.8 per cent of gross national product (GNP) in 1986 to 8.5 per cent in
1999.7 This was largely as a result of reduced expenditure on
unemployment supports as the economy improved. Also rapid economic
growth from the mid-1990s meant there were substantial increases in the
absolute amounts available for social expenditure to maintain it as a
constant proportion of GNP/GDP. There were thus significant
improvements in real welfare rates although, as earnings rose, these fell
as a proportion of average disposable incomes, thereby increasing the
gap between those on welfare and those at work. Also, social expenditure
failed to keep up with economic growth in the latter part of the decade,
when it fell as a proportion of both GNP and GDP. A third of households
in Ireland continue to live in relative income poverty, although
considerable progress has been made in reducing consistent poverty from
14.4 per cent in 1994 to 5.5 per cent in 2000.8
The report shows the growth in the absolute amounts spent on social
expenditure in Ireland during the 1990s, but raises some concerns about
the efficiency of that growth, noting that the category of employment that
grew fastest in the health services, for example, was ‘management and
administration’. This shows how rapid increases in expenditure can create
pressure in administering change and that change management needs to
be an important element in the delivery of social services. Additional
resources spent on administration is obviously money which could
potentially have been spent on better health care provision for those who
Irish Social Expenditure in a Comparative International Context
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7 ibid.
8 The relative income poverty line referred to here is 60 per cent of mean income (Brian
Nolan, Brenda Gannon, Richard Layte, Dorothy Watson, Christopher T. Whelan and
James Williams, Monitoring Poverty Trends in Ireland: Results from the 2000 Living in
Ireland Survey [Dublin, ESRI: 2002]). Consistent poverty refers to relative income
poverty combined with basic deprivation, such as not being able to afford a warm coat. 
are disadvantaged. The disproportionate growth of administration
represents a loss for both equity and efficiency.
The report also notes that in Ireland social transfers, other than
pensions, are heavily concentrated on low-income individuals and
households. There is an obvious advantage in this approach in that welfare
spending is more directly targeted on those who most need it. However,
this approach also has disadvantages. For example, it has given those that
are better-off incentives to take out private insurances that are in many
cases sponsored by the state through tax reliefs. Thus the Irish welfare state
conforms closely to the Anglo-Saxon model, which with its ‘emphasis on
targeted means-testing for the poor and private occupational plans for
core workers … reinforce(s) rather than mute(s) market-based
stratification.’9 People who are in receipt of welfare payments either have
rationed access to services such as health care, have to accept lower
quality services, or both. This has further knock-on effects for health,
human capital formation, life-time earnings and quality of life.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The report notes that in countries with high levels of market income
inequality, such as Ireland, more extensive social spending is required to
achieve the same poverty outcomes as countries with a more equal market
distribution of incomes. Thus the welfare system must ‘work harder’. This
is the main finding of the report. Ireland has a low level of welfare effort
for a rich country, even taking into account factors such as the country’s
relatively youthful population or the greater provision of private pensions. 
SOCIAL SPENDING AND THE LABOUR MARKET
In 1988 the NESC noted that expanded ‘welfare effort’ over the 1970s
reduced inequality of final incomes, even as inequality in market incomes was
increasing. However, the report also noted that ‘perversely, the enhanced
redistributive impact of transfers ar(ose) because of rising unemployment and
the necessarily burgeoning role of unemployment payments.’10 Unnecessarily
increasing unemployment is something that must be avoided at all costs. 
This current report notes that some countries have high and sustained
economic growth while also spending heavily on social protection. It has
been observed that the Dutch and Danish employment performance has been
Foreword
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9 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies (Oxford and
New York, Oxford University Press: 1999). 
10 NESC, ibid, p. 167. 
more impressive than that of Britain or Australia despite massive deregulation
in the latter two countries.11 Substantial reductions in poverty were also
achieved. Child family poverty rates fell by 10 per cent in Denmark and in
Sweden by 42 per cent from the 1980s to the 1990s.12 In Sweden the
poverty rates for people living in single parent households is the same as that
for the entire population.13 In Ireland their risk is nearly treble the average.14
The International Labour Office notes that small open developed
economies tend to have strong social security systems to buffer them from
the impacts of global economic downturns.15 In this way there is a
complementarity between globalisation and strong welfare systems. In a
post-’Celtic Tiger’ environment the report calls for higher social spending
and particularly for better and more universal provision of services. 
The report also welcomes the move from passive to active income
support16 as it notes that this can create work incentives and opportunities
for groups such as lone parents and long-term unemployed people.17
Active labour market policies can facilitate structural change when the
economy is near full employment by reducing the mismatch between skills
supply and demand.18 However, there is also a need to develop ‘bridge-
building’ programmes to ensure that transitions from unemployment are
into high-quality sustainable jobs.19 This requires paying attention to the
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11 Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations.
12 ibid, p. 156. 
13 Michael Förster and Mark Pearson, ‘Income Distribution and Poverty in the OECD Area:
Trends and Driving Forces’, OECD Economic Studies No. 34, 2001/I: pp 7-39. 
14 Using the 50 per cent of median income line used in the study by Förster and Pearson.
In Ireland 13.8 per cent of persons fell below 50 per cent of median income in 2000.
For persons in single adult households with children the figure was 39.7 per cent (Nolan
et al., Monitoring Poverty Trends). 
15 International Labour Office, Social Security: A New Consensus (Geneva, International
Labour Office: 2001). 
16 Active income support provides training to enable people to look for employment or
provides cash payments to support people taking up employment.
17 Some authors argue that in addition to active labour market programmes, there is also
a need to pay attention to the demand side of the economy (see J. Peck and N.
Theodore, ‘Beyond “employability”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 24 (2000) and
Guy Standing, Beyond the New Paternalism: Basic Income as Equality [London, Verso:
2002]). 
18 Jaap de Koning, Hugh Mosley and Günther Schmid, ‘Introduction: Active Labour
Market Policies, Social Exclusion and Transitional Labour Markets’ in Jaap de Koning
and Hugh Mosley, Labour Market Policy and Unemployment: Impact and Process
Evaluation in Selected European Countries (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar: 2001). 
19 Jamie Peck and Nicholas Theodore, ‘Beyond “employability”’, Cambridge Journal of
Economics, 24 (2000): 733. 
demand side of the economy in order to ensure sufficient job creation to
allow this to happen.
Evidence from the report suggests a need to stabilise ‘old age’
dependency ratios by encouraging the labour force participation of
women, young and older workers. This report argues that as
unemployment in Ireland has fallen more people have gained entitlement
to contributory payments and would therefore benefit from further
improvement in these benefits. 
FUNDING AND STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURE
Higher social expenditure requires higher rates of taxation, broadening
the tax base and/or the reduction of tax reliefs.20 These are sometimes
thought to be politically unfeasible and/or economically inadvisable.
However, even in the context of constraints imposed by the globalisation
of the economy it is possible to raise taxes on non-mobile factors,
particularly land and property, without adversely affecting the economy.
There is also a debate about corporation tax, with some commentators
suggesting this could be raised to 17.5 per cent without deterring inward
investment.21 Other proposals have included the introduction of a third
higher rate of income tax of 50 per cent for high earners. 
A higher level of redistribution could also be achieved within the
system, with the same average level of taxation if the rate of progressivity
was improved.22 Redistribution is achieved through the health and
education systems, depending on the extent of the subsidy (direct or
indirect) to different social classes. The extent of the subsidy is dependent
on the ‘take-up’ rate of the services by different social groups and, in
education, the amount of the additional cost per year, which becomes
progressively higher from primary to tertiary levels.23 Currently middle
and higher income groups have higher take-up rates for tertiary
education given the competitive points-based nature of admission. This
suggests the importance of greater public investment in primary and
secondary education in disadvantaged areas to ‘level the playing field’.
The report shows that there is a considerable degree of choice in terms
of models for social service provision. For example, tax expenditures, e.g.
Foreword
xiii
20 Analysis of the tax system and the impacts on poverty reduction is the subject of a
Combat Poverty Agency study to be published in the future. 
21 D. Duffy et al., Medium Term Review 2001-2007, (Dublin, ESRI: 2001).
22 NESC, Redistribution Through State Social Expenditure in the Republic of Ireland:
1973-1980, Report No. 85 (Dublin, NESC: 1988). 
23 NESC, ibid. 
tax relief of pensions and health care, tend to benefit upper income groups
disproportionately, whereas direct service provision more directly benefits
lower income groups. The report makes clear that there is a need to take tax
changes into account when making changes to welfare policy: ‘Improving
services and making access to services more equitable calls for both
decreasing and re-engineering tax relief on private insurance, and for
channelling more tax revenue to services’ (p. 59). Some of these services can
be delivered efficiently through community provision, supported by the state. 
SERVICE LEVEL AND DELIVERY
There is a need for ‘high pay-off input’ approaches in the delivery of
services such as health care. Research has shown that when it comes to
health care, prevention is better than cure, not only for patients but also
for government finances. Preventive, community health care approaches
have an important contribution to make in this regard. 
A particularly important underprovided service is child care, which
has a variety of benefits including building future human capital and
allowing parents to more easily access the labour market24 and to
improve their opportunities for second chance education and training. 
There is also a need for greater attention to insights from ‘new public
management theory’ with its emphasis on institutional innovation, efficiency,
evaluation, customer service and ‘joined-up’ government to ensure
coherence. One of the recommendations of the Against all odds report is a
greater focus on integrated service provision for people living in poverty.25
DATA AND RESEARCH
One of the policy implications from the report is the need for better and
more up-to-date data in order to make informed choices about social
expenditure.26 There are data gaps at both national and international
levels. At international level there are no reliable longitudinal, cross-
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24 This has been noted in the international literature as an important issue in Ireland.
Ireland has a high ‘incompatibility score’ between having two or more children and
employment for women (Blanchet and Pennec [1993] cited in Esping-Andersen, p. 69).
Until such time as universal childcare access has been guaranteed, great care should be
taken in reducing the number of places for lone parents on programmes such as
community employment (CE) as this risks complete detachment from the labour market. 
25 Mary Daly and Madeline Leonard, Against all odds: Family Life on Low Income in
Ireland (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration and Combat Poverty Agency: 2002). 
26 Some progress has been made towards this. See National Statistics Board, Developing
Irish Social and Equality Statistics to meet Policy Needs: Report of the Steering Group
on Social and Equality Statistics (Dublin, Stationary Office: 2003).
national data on total social expenditure. In Ireland the report points to
the need for better public service expenditure data in order to make
informed policy choices. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In terms of the evolution of social expenditure, there are a variety of issues
that must be addressed. The first is how much is spent. This report makes
a convincing case that there needs to be more investment in social
expenditure. The second issue is around priorities. Which areas should be
prioritised in a context of limited state resources? This is a subject that
requires further research, but the report does offer some pointers in this
regard, highlighting the importance of better child care provision, for
example. The third issue relates to strategies of provision. The report notes
that preventive, universal approaches are now generally more
appropriate than curative and targeted ones. 
In its recent strategy statement NESC has again argued that the
welfare ‘system has left more inequality than is socially fair or
economically desirable. More telling still, judged against a goal that has
become increasingly central to Irish economic and social well-being –
equality of opportunity – the system has not achieved what the Council
believes to be necessary.’27 The Council also notes that ‘social exclusion
cannot be further reduced if the quality of services is not greatly
improved’ (p.64) and that there is a ‘historic opportunity to now guide the
evolution of Ireland’s social assistance and social insurance systems to
align and converge into a truly developmental welfare state that secures
social inclusion while respecting economic exigencies’ (p.65). ‘There
should be more attention given to the overall pattern of distribution in
income, state benefits, and tax expenditures, in order to ensure the
creation of a more equal and inclusive society and the need to surmount
two-tier systems’ (p.106). This report provides empirical data and
arguments that strongly support these positions. 
The Combat Poverty Agency believes that in order to advance the fight
on poverty it is necessary to reconceptualise the nature of the Irish welfare
state. One approach would be to move closer to the Danish model of
‘flexicurity’, with a flexible labour market and a strong welfare state. This
report through its context and analysis makes an important contribution
to the debate about the future direction of the Irish welfare system. 
Introduction
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27 National Economic and Social Council, An Investment in Quality: Services, Inclusion
and Enterprise: Overview, Conclusions and Recommendations (Dublin, NESC: 2002). 
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION – WHAT IS SOCIAL
EXPENDITURE?
Social expenditure is a popular topic of debate and statistics relating to
such expenditure are frequently discussed in newspapers and other
media. However, these debates and statistics can give rise to a certain
amount of confusion as the assumptions behind them are often not made
clear. It may not be accurate, for example, to state that ‘country A has
higher social expenditure than country B, therefore it generates greater
levels of well-being’, or that ‘the economy of country X has been growing
very slowly because it spends too much on social protection’, since the
causal connections between the level of social expenditure and social
well-being or economic growth are by no means automatic or
straightforward. 
This study seeks to present a clear definition of social expenditure and
identify the ways in which social expenditure in Ireland differs from that
in other advanced industrialised economies (EU member states and
countries within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development – OECD). Understanding social expenditure is vital for
informed debate on the future shape of the Irish welfare state. No
meaningful statements or recommendations can be made without
understanding the basic mechanisms by which social expenditure is
financed and distributed. 
It is therefore hoped that this study will be useful for policy makers,
analysts and general readers who have an interest in how social
expenditure is used to redistribute resources in society. The study is of
particular relevance at a time when, following a period of growth, the
Irish economy and welfare state are entering a new stage during which
more careful, and doubtlessly painful, choices will have to be made in the
area of generating and spending revenue.
The OECD (2000) defines social expenditure as ‘the provision by public
and private institutions of benefits to, and financial contributions targeted
1
at, households and individuals in order to provide support during
circumstances that adversely affect their welfare’. Most people think of
social expenditure as cash payments (transfers), but social expenditure can
also take the form of direct (in-kind) provision of goods and services. Social
expenditure statistics vary in the number of social services that they take into
account. Some statistics only measure transfer expenditure, whereas others
take into account health spending, social care services spending and even
the cost of public housing programmes and subsidies. Since only benefits
provided by institutions are included in most statistics and definitions,
transfers between households – even when they are of a social nature – are
not. For instance, money spent by children who pay their parents’ nursing
home fees is not included in most measures of social expenditure. 
In addition to transfer and service expenditure, there is a further
significant form of social expenditure, called tax expenditure: this is
revenue that the state has decided to forego in order to encourage private
insurance or service provision. Thus there are three main categories of
social spending: transfers, services and tax expenditures.
In sum, social expenditure consists of publicly and privately funded
cash transfers (benefits), services (such as health care) and financial
contributions (tax expenditure) that are designed to support recipients at
times when they are affected by one or more social risk(s) such as old
age, ill health, disability or unemployment. Some cash transfers are based
on previous employment and contributions records – these are known as
social insurance benefits. They are often largely financed by contributions
from employees and employers (earnings-related benefits). Other benefits
are based on need, rather than previous contributions. These are usually
known as means-tested benefits because they are awarded only after an
examination of the recipient’s financial circumstances has established that
he or she needs the benefit in order to cover basic living costs. These
benefits, as well as universal benefits that are paid to everyone regardless
of means or contributions (e.g. child benefit in Ireland), are usually funded
through general tax revenue, rather than employee and employer social
insurance contributions. 
Expenditure on health and social services is funded in most European
countries through general tax revenue, although earnings-related
insurance schemes and user fees play a central role in some countries,
particularly in Central Europe.
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Table 1.1 Main types of transfer payments and their financing
Basis of entitlement Type of transfer Source of funding 
Citizenship-based Universal General taxation 
Employment-based Earnings-related Employee/employer 
contributions (sometimes 
also general taxation in part) 
Needs-based Means-tested General taxation 
Different countries and organisations have different understandings of
what should be counted as social expenditure. Moreover, these definitions
vary over time so that it is often difficult to find consistent longitudinal data
on total social expenditure (services and transfers, public and private
expenditure, pre-tax and post-tax etc.) in one country, let alone cross-
national comparative data. In principle, measures of social expenditure
could include expenditure on a very large range of public and private
programmes such as education, community policing and transport, in
addition to cash transfers and services such as health care, because all of
these have an impact on people’s welfare. Most measures of social
expenditure, however, restrict themselves to transfer expenditure and
health and social services, thus excluding areas such as education and
housing. Nevertheless, great variations in data and definitions persist
between different countries and periods of time. It is important to ensure
that data on social expenditure are commensurable before using them for
comparative purposes across time or across countries. 
The OECD Social Expenditure Database, the most detailed comparative
database in the area of social expenditure, groups expenditures with a
social purpose as follows:
• old-age cash benefits
• disability cash benefits
• occupational injury and disease benefits
• sickness benefits
• services for the elderly and disabled
• survivors benefits
• family cash benefits
• family services
• active labour market policies, i.e. employment support
• unemployment compensation
Introduction – What is social expenditure?
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• housing benefits
• public health expenditure
• other contingencies, e.g. benefits to those on low income.
This study will discuss in some detail five of the above expenditure
categories, namely old-age cash benefits, family cash benefits,
unemployment compensation, active labour market policies and public
health expenditure.
Some statistics include tax expenditures that serve the purpose of
providing protection against social risks. Tax expenditures are expenditures
made through the tax system. Instead of giving money to individuals, as
happens in the case of cash transfers, the state chooses to forego a certain
amount of tax revenue in order to support or encourage individuals to make
arrangements for their own social protection. Examples of tax expenditure
are tax relief for pensions saving and tax relief for private medical
insurance, both of which are in place in Ireland. Tax expenditure is an
alternative to transfer payments, although the redistributive outcomes of the
two may be very different (see ‘The redistributive effects of social
expenditure’ in Chapter 4). 
The net total social expenditure measure developed by Adema (2001)
includes tax expenditures for social purposes, but this measure also takes
into account the impact of direct and indirect taxation of benefit incomes.
This is significant because many governments claw back some social
expenditure by taxing benefits directly and/or indirectly through taxes on
goods and services that benefits are used to purchase. 
The role of direct and indirect taxes and social contributions varies
considerably between countries. For instance in 1995 income tax and
social contributions paid by benefit recipients amounted to 5-6 per cent
of GDP in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, whereas such taxes
were less than 0.5 per cent of GDP in Australia, Ireland, the UK and the
US (OECD 1999a: 30). The full meaning and significance of using net
instead of gross social expenditure figures will be elaborated on below in
the section ‘Gross vs. net social expenditure’ and in Chapter 3, ‘Cross-
national analysis of social expenditure’.
In summary, it is important to take note of the following factors when
analysing and comparing statistics related to social expenditure:
First, social spending statistics are not always comparable as they are
based on different definitions of social expenditure. Care is therefore
required in comparing across different databases and statistics collected
Irish Social Expenditure in a Comparative International Context
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by different organisations. A number of different statistics and databases
are utilised in this report, as it is not possible to obtain comparable statistics
on total social expenditure covering a long period of time for both Ireland
and a selection of other OECD countries.
Second, social expenditure varies according to whether we take into
account the impact of tax expenditure and the tax treatment of social
transfers. 
GROSS VS. NET SOCIAL EXPENDITURE
This section outlines in more detail the difference between gross and net
social expenditure. Most statistics and analyses of social expenditure are
restricted to gross public social expenditure, i.e. public social expenditure
before the impact of taxes is taken into account. Limitations of data and
difficulties of data collection mean that this is often the only reasonably
reliable measure of social effort available. However, while aggregate (or
gross) social expenditure expressed as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) or gross national product (GNP) is a useful and revealing
indicator of the extent of social expenditure in a country, it can also be
misleading for a number of reasons.
First, direct (income) taxes and social security contributions diminish
the amount of money that is at the disposal of benefit recipients. This
‘clawing back’ of resources allocated to social expenditure obviously has
implications for the actual level of social effort and redistribution. The
extent to which taxes and social security contributions are levied on
benefit recipients varies considerably between countries: whereas they
are rather heavy in the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, they are
very light in Australia, Germany, the UK, the US and Ireland. Differences
in direct taxes paid by benefit recipients reflect the scale of social
expenditure (how much is spent in total), the extent to which these
payments are targeted to those on low incomes, and the extent to which
benefits are exempt from tax.
Second, there is great variation in the amount of benefit income that is
‘clawed back’ through indirect taxes on consumption. The difference is
particularly notable between the US and most European countries. Benefit
recipients use their income to purchase goods and services, most of which
are subject to indirect taxes such as VAT. This tax flows back to the Exchequer
and therefore should be deducted from gross spending in order to obtain a
more accurate picture of resources that are in fact being spent on social
protection. In practice, however, most social expenditure statistics do not
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take into account indirect taxes such as value-added tax (VAT). 
Third, tax breaks for social purposes are usually not taken into account
in aggregate or even programme-level expenditure figures. Some fiscal
measures can be seen as cash benefit replacements: child tax allowances
for families with children are an example of such tax breaks. Other
measures stimulate the provision of private benefits: for example, tax
advantages for companies that provide private child care or nursing
homes for older people. While such ‘social tax expenditure’ varies a lot
in scope between countries, it plays a significant role in a number of
countries. For instance, tax breaks towards employment-based health
insurance in the US amounted to almost 1 per cent of GDP in 1995. Tax
breaks for social purposes tend to be non-existent or play a very small
role in countries that rely on a high level of direct taxes to fund social
expenditure. Usually the value of tax allowances for social purposes is
smaller than the amount of benefit income clawed back through direct
and indirect taxes. As a result, net public social expenditure tends to be
lower than gross spending indicators.
Fourth, private social expenditure, whether subsidised through tax
breaks or not, can account for a considerable share of net total social
expenditure in a country. However, most social spending in OECD
countries is public. The UK and the Netherlands are the only exceptions to
the rule that over 90 per cent of social expenditure in the European OECD
countries is public.1 Private social spending exceeds one-third of all social
expenditure in the US. To be considered as part of social expenditure,
private programmes have to serve a social purpose and contain an
element of inter-personal redistribution. For instance, a private pension or
a life insurance policy that entitles the recipient to benefits strictly in
accordance with the amount and timing of payments made, would not be
considered ‘social’. However, a compulsory or a voluntary company
scheme (in health insurance, pensions etc) that involved risk-sharing and
redistribution from low-risk or high-earning groups to high-risk or low-
earnings groups would be considered social. For the most part, individual
insurance arrangements do not fit the definition of ‘social’ because their
cost to the individual is based on market prices and on his or her risk-
profile. However, public intervention sometimes introduces elements of risk-
and cost-sharing through fiscal measures or legal requirements, for
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1 However, private expenditure tends to play a more important role in the area of
services, and of health services in particular. For instance, nearly 23 per cent of total
health expenditure in Ireland was private expenditure in 1996 (Department of Health
and Children 1999: 223).
instance, which means that the programme can be counted as private
social expenditure (Adema 2001: 9). It is very difficult, however, to obtain
reliable data on total private social expenditure.
In light of the limitations of focusing on gross public social expenditure,
two indicators have been developed that aim to measure how much
governments in fact spend on social protection (net public social
expenditure) and what proportion of the economy’s domestic production is
spent on public and private social protection (net total social expenditure).
These indicators capture the impact on social effort of both private
expenditure and the tax system. However, limitations of (comparable) data
mean that analysis of all OECD countries in the light of these indicators is
not possible (for more detailed definitions and analysis see Chapter 3
‘Cross-national analysis of social expenditure’).
WHAT INFLUENCES THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURE?
Having established the meaning of social expenditure, we will now outline
some of the factors that influence its level. As will be illustrated below,
regardless of the measure used, levels of social expenditure vary a great
deal between countries and periods of time. Differences between social
expenditure levels reflect not only differences in social protection systems,
but also variation in demographics, levels of unemployment and a range
of other social and economic factors.
It is important to note, as Maguire (1984: 77) points out, that ‘changes
in income maintenance expenditures may result from a variety of
influences, some of a purely automatic nature (e.g. demographic trends)
and some of a discretionary nature (e.g. extension of the coverage of
programmes)’ (my emphasis). In her article, Maguire examines the
contribution to expenditure growth of changes in demographic structure,
eligibility for benefits, and average transfer payments per beneficiary.
She is interested in the extent to which expenditure growth is the result of
demographic changes such as population ageing, or of extension (or
reduction) in the number of people eligible for benefits, or of changes in
the level of benefits. Obviously, it is of interest to know whether social
expenditure increases because of population ageing (‘automatic’
expansion as people reach the age at which they are entitled to pensions),
or because of deliberate decisions to change the level of benefits. In the
former case, no political action is required, although political action can
obviously play a role in shaping demographics in the long term; in the
latter case, an act of political will is necessary to bring about an increase
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or a decrease in expenditure. In the case of pensions, Maguire established
that the increase in expenditure in Ireland between 1951-1979 was not
due to demographic change as the over-65 population remained very
stable during this period, but rather it was due to an increase in the
proportion of older people receiving pensions (extension of eligibility) and
to increases in pensions (1984: 78).
A large number of demographic, economic and social factors can
influence the level of social expenditure. Table 1.2 and the discussion
below outline some of these factors. It is important to bear in mind that
these factors do not inevitably lead to an increase or a decrease in social
expenditure. For instance, even if expenditure on pensions increases as
the number of eligible older people increases, it is still possible, by
political means, to curtail that increase in expenditure.
Table 1.2 Demographic, economic and social influences on social
expenditure
Demographic Economic Social
Proportion of older Level of unemployment Household size
people
Proportion of children Employment rate Family structure
Proportion of students Economic growth Take-up rate of benefits
Proportion of immigrants Information on benefits 
Demographic trends are of particular significance for the composition of
social expenditure in Ireland (see Fahey and FitzGerald 1997). Due to the
relatively low proportion of older people in the Irish population, pensions
expenditure in Ireland has been relatively low – although, as will be shown
below, expenditure on old age nonetheless forms the largest single category
of social welfare spending. Old people also tend to be the biggest
consumers of health care services and an increase in the number of old
people in the population is therefore likely to lead to increased health
expenditure. Ireland’s relatively young population structure goes some way
towards explaining the low level of social expenditure in Ireland, but is only
one of the factors that have contributed to the decline of social expenditure
as a proportion of national wealth over the last decade. 
The proportion of children in the population can also influence social
expenditure because, like older people, children are to a greater extent
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than working-age adults dependent on social transfers such as child
benefits, and on services such as education and child care. The proportion
of students in the population can have a similar impact, as most students
do not work full-time, but this impact depends very much on the number
and generosity of benefits that students are entitled to, and neither are very
significant in Ireland. The proportion of immigrants can also affect the level
of social expenditure, although this depends very much on the social and
employment rights of immigrants, as well as on their age profile.
A variety of economic factors influence the level and rate of growth of
social expenditure. When combined with political will, economic growth
has historically tended to increase social expenditure. The three post-war
decades comprised a period of strong economic growth and welfare state
expansion in industrialised countries. Countries that are ‘catching-up’
often have faster levels of growth in aggregate social expenditure. Spain
in the 1980s is a good example of this phenomenon. Rising
unemployment tends to create a dual pressure on public finances as tax
revenue decreases and social transfers increase simultaneously, leading to
an increase in aggregate social expenditure and possibly to an increase
in the social expenditure/GDP ratio. Economic growth and decreased
unemployment can lead to diminishing social expenditure as fewer
people are in need of transfers such as unemployment benefits, and as
increased income from work pushes people above the income limits for
certain benefits. However, it is important to note that these tendencies are
not ‘laws of nature’. Whereas economic growth may in one country lead
to higher levels of social protection, it may not have the same result in
another. It is also crucial to understand the difference between aggregate
expenditure and expenditure measured as a percentage of the national
wealth: even when the former increases, the latter can decrease if
economic growth is faster than the growth in aggregate expenditure.
A large number of social factors can influence the need for social
transfers and, therefore, the aggregate level of social expenditure. In
general, one-person households have lower median equivalised incomes
than households consisting of two or more persons (European
Commission/Eurostat 2000a: 30). This means that one-person households
tend to be in greater need of, and more likely to qualify for, income
transfers targeted at low-income individuals. Similarly, the incomes of lone
parents in most countries are lower than those of married or co-habiting
parents. For these reasons, an increase in one-person households and lone
parent families creates a greater need for redistribution, although this does
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not mean that additional or more extensive redistributive policies will come
into existence – this requires an act of political will. Take-up rates of
benefits also influence the level of expenditure. Lack of information,
inaccurate information, or stigmatisation of benefit recipients can reduce
the number of benefit claimants to a lower level than would otherwise
prevail. 
In summary, a large number of demographic, economic and social
factors, besides political will, can and do affect the level of social
expenditure. However, the most important influences on contemporary
social expenditure patterns have been unemployment, economic growth
and catch-up from prior expenditure levels (Castles 2001a). 
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CHAPTER 2
SOCIAL EXPENDITURE IN IRELAND 1960-
2000 – HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
INVESTMENT IN SOCIAL PROTECTION
This chapter examines the historical evolution of social protection
expenditure in Ireland. Table 2.1 outlines the rapid increase in public
social expenditure in Ireland from the early 1950s to the late 1970s. The
GDP share of social expenditure grew by more than ten percentage points
during these three decades, and the income transfers/GDP ratio more
than doubled. (Note that this table includes expenditure on education and
housing, not included in most statistics on social expenditure.) The
purpose of presenting this table is to illustrate the rapid growth of the
welfare state during the three post-war decades, a development that
Ireland shared alongside most other Western countries.
Table 2.1 Public social expenditure in Ireland, percentage of GDP
Year Total Income Health Education Housing 
social maintenance
expenditure
1951 15.9 4.6 3.3 3.1 4.8 
1970 19.8 7.6 4.5 5.2 2.5 
1979 26.5 9.6 7.3 6.3 3.3 
Source: Maguire 1984: 76. Total social expenditure here refers to expenditure of
public authorities on health, education, housing, social security and welfare – this
definition is considerably broader than those utilised in most other data sources.
Income maintenance refers to transfer payments. 
(Based on data from the Central Statistics Office.)
Table 2.2 illustrates how social security transfers as a share of GDP
increased rapidly in Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s (although remaining
11
below the EU average), then stagnated at a relatively high level in the
1980s before falling to a lower level in the course of the late 1980s and
the 1990s. Note that unlike Table 2.1, the percentages in this table
contain only transfer (cash benefit) expenditure, and exclude service
expenditure such as health and housing. 
The table also illustrates the steady upward trend in the percentage of
national wealth devoted to social security transfers in developed (OECD)
countries during the post-war years, with the 1960s and 1970s in
particular being the ‘golden decades’ of welfare state growth. There are
some exceptions to this trend as a number of late-comers only caught up
with the rest in the 1980s: Spain and the other Mediterranean EU member
states are good examples of this delayed expansion. 
Most strikingly, Ireland is the only significant exception among most
other OECD countries to the fact that social security/GDP ratio (‘welfare
effort’) expanded between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. In other
words, while welfare effort increased in most other OECD countries, in
Ireland it decreased from the mid-1980s. During this period, Ireland was
converging with the US, and diverging from the EU average.
Table 2.2 Social security transfers, percentage of GDP
1960 1974 1986 1989 1994 1999 
Ireland 5.5 11.4 17.2 14.2 12.1 9.6 
US 5.1 9.6 10.8 10.6 12.8 12.6* 
Germany 12.0 14.6 15.9 15.7 18.2 18.9 
UK 6.8 9.2 13.6 11.2 15.4 13.5 
Spain 2.3 9.5 15.6 15.4 18.0 17.2* 
Sweden 8.0 14.3 18.3 19.4 24.8 18.9 
EU-15 9.7 13.3 17.6 16.9 19.7 16.8
Total OECD 6.9 0.6 13.5 13.2 15.5 14.2* 
Source: OECD Historical Statistics 1997a, p. 71. OECD Historical Statistics 2001a, 
p. 67.
* Data for US are for 1996, Spain for 1995, and total OECD for 1998 (most recent
figures available).
Table 2.3 illustrates the relative stagnation in social protection expenditure
in Ireland during the 1980s: the expenditure/GDP ratio increased towards
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the middle of the decade – largely due to increasing unemployment –
before falling again as a result of severe cuts in public expenditure in the
late 1980s. This table presents information on the proportion of national
wealth allocated to social expenditure. It does not indicate whether
aggregate expenditure increased or decreased. In fact, social expenditure
increased considerably during the 1980s (Ó Riain and O’Connell 2000)
but poor economic performance meant that the need and demand for
social protection also grew. Expenditure on health relative to GDP declined
during this period, while expenditure on the aged remained very stable,
and expenditure on the non-aged increased – much of this increase being
due to unemployment.
Table 2.3 Public social protection expenditure in Ireland,
percentage of GDP
Year Total Health Aged Non-aged 
1980 19.9 8.0 6.2 5.7 
1981 20.4 7.7 6.4 6.3 
1982 21.9 7.5 6.8 7.5 
1983 22.7 7.4 6.9 8.3 
1984 22.1 7.0 6.8 8.3 
1985 22.3 7.0 6.7 8.6 
1986 22.4 6.9 6.7 8.9 
1987 21.7 6.5 6.6 8.6 
1988 20.4 5.9 6.3 8.1 
Source: OECD (1996) Economies at a Glance: Social Indicators, p. 108.
It is clear from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 that in aggregate, or gross, terms,
social expenditure in Ireland grew significantly in the 1990s. Whereas
total social welfare expenditure was just over IR£3 billion (A3.81 billion)
in 1991, it amounted to almost IR£5.3 billion (A6.73 billion) in 2000
(note that Table 2.5 refers only to cash benefit expenditure, i.e. it excludes
expenditure on services). Table 2.4 shows that, with the exception of
Portugal, the rate of social expenditure growth in Ireland in the 1990s
was faster than in any other EU member state.
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Table 2.4 Expenditure on social protection per capita at constant
prices (index 1990 = 100)
1990 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999
EU-15 100 113 118 119 121 124
Belgium 100 115 117 118 122 125
Denmark 100 113 122 121 122 123
Germany 100 104 114 112 114 117
Greece 100 96 104 111 120 130
Spain 100 124 122 123 125 127
France 100 110 114 115 118 120
Ireland 100 119 130 137 142 150
Italy 100 108 108 113 113 116
Luxembourg 100 120 135 138 141 149
Netherlands 100 104 102 103 103 105
Austria 100 110 118 118 120 125
Portugal 100 144 163 174 189 201
Finland 100 116 122 120 120 120
Sweden 100 108 106 106 110 113
UK 100 129 136 136 136 139 
Source: Eurostat 2002.
Although social expenditure in the 1990s has grown briskly in real terms
(substantially faster than consumer prices), its share of Irish GDP/GNP
has fallen (see the last two columns of Table 2.5). This is due to the fact
that increases in social expenditure have not kept pace with economic
growth. In comparison with most other EU countries, both general
government total outlays and social expenditure as a proportion of
GDP/GNP are very low in Ireland. Indeed, as will be shown below, the
level of public and social expenditure in Ireland is now closer to the US
than to EU levels (Ó Riain and O’Connell 2000: 310). Note that, although
most comparative statistics express social expenditure as a share of GDP,
using GNP as a baseline is useful in the case of Ireland as a considerable
share of wealth created in the country is repatriated by foreign
multinational companies.
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Table 2.5 Social welfare expenditure in Ireland, 1991-2000
Year Index of Consumer Social welfare expenditure
expenditure price index  as a percentage of 
GNP GDP 
1991 100.0 100.0 11.7 10.4 
1992 111.0 103.1 12.3 10.9 
1993 117.3 104.6 11.9 10.7 
1994 121.6 107.0 11.4 10.3 
1995 135.8 109.8 11.4 10.1 
1996 141.6 111.6 10.8 9.6 
1997 146.3 113.2 9.7 8.6 
1998 154.0 115.9 9.0 7.9 
1999 160.0 117.9 8.4 7.2 
2000 171.0 124.5 7.8 6.6 
Source: Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs (2001) Statistical
Information on Social Welfare Services 2000, Section A, p. 3.
STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL SPENDING IN IRELAND
In addition to examining social expenditure in Ireland (both historically
and in comparison with other OECD countries), analysis of expenditure in
selected key areas is essential if we are to gain a full understanding of the
extent and nature of social spending in Ireland. Longitudinal examination
of social spending broken down by expenditure areas may also reveal
important shifts in the pattern of expenditure. In most countries, pensions
and health are the two areas where the bulk of social expenditure is
concentrated. While pensions expenditure in Ireland is comparatively low,
due to the country’s demographic profile and the low level of pensions, it
nonetheless constitutes the single largest share of total social welfare
expenditure (see Table 2.6) and has a significant impact on reducing
inequalities. 
Expenditure on unemployment and employment supports (the latter
are often referred to as active labour market policies) will also be
analysed separately. The change in this area was dramatic in the 1990s
and the drop in unemployment expenditure has arguably been one of the
main driving forces in the growth of other expenditure categories, as well
as one of the reasons for the decline in social expenditure as a proportion
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of GDP/GNP. The fact that unemployment and employment supports are
now analysed separately in the annual statistical report of the Department
of Social and Family Affairs reflects the emphasis on activation in recent
years. 
Child-related expenditure will be briefly discussed as this has been an
important policy priority in recent years.
Table 2.6 Percentage expenditure on social welfare by
programme, 1990 and 2000
Expenditure category 1990 2000 
Old age Old age
Old-Age (Contributory) 30.1 Incl. Old Age Contrib. and 25.4
Pension, Retirement Pension, Non-Contrib. Pension,
Old Age and Blind (Non- Retirement Pension and
Contrib.) Pension, Pre- Pre-Retirement Allowance
Retirement Allowance, 
Free Schemes
Family income support Widows, widowers and 
one-parent families
Widow’s Pensions (Contrib. 26.3 Incl. Widow/er’s Contrib. 18.9 
and Non-Contrib.), Deserted and Non-Contrib. Pension,
Wife’s Benefit and Allowance, Deserted Wife’s Allowance 
Lone Parent’s Allowance, and Benefit, Prisoner’s Wife’s
Prisoner’s Wife’s Allowance, Allowance, One Parent 
Orphan’s Allowance (Contrib. Family Payment 
and Non-Contrib.), Child 
Benefit, Maternity Allowances, 
Family Income Supplement, 
Supplementary Welfare 
Allowance, Carer’s Allowance 
Unemployment Unemployment supports
Unemployment Benefit and 25.4 Unemployment Benefit 10.9
Assistance, Pay-Related Benefit and Assistance 
Payable with Unemployment 
Benefit, Special schemes for 
the unemployed 
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Expenditure category 1990 2000 
Illness Illness, disability and caring
Disability Benefit, Pay- 12.5 Incl. Disability Benefit, 15.6
Related Benefit payable with Invalidity Pension, Injury 
Disability Benefit and Injury Benefit, Disablement Benefit, 
Benefit, Invalidity Pension, Death Benefit, Disability
Occupational Injuries Benefit, Allowance, Medical care, 
Free Schemes Carer’s Allowance, Blind 
Person’s Pension 
Administration 4.8 Administration 4.8 
Miscellaneous Misc. payments and grants
Single Woman’s Allowance, 0.9 Treatment benefits, Rent 5.2
Rent Allowance, Death Grant, Allowance, Free Schemes etc. 
Treatment Benefit, National 
Fuel Scheme, School Meals 
Supplementary welfare 
allowance 4.4 
Employment supports
Family Income Supplement, 4.2
Employment support services 
(Back to Work Allowance, 
Back to Education Allowance, 
Back to Work Enterprise 
Allowance, Students’ Summer 
Jobs scheme, Part-Time Job 
Incentive scheme), Farm Assist 
Source: Department of Social Welfare 1991: 3, and Department of Social, Community
and Family Affairs 2001: 2. Categories of expenditure were changed between 1990
and 2000. 
It is important also to note the proportion of social expenditure spent on
means-tested benefits. As indicated above, there are, broadly speaking,
three types of cash benefit: universal, earnings-related and means-tested. 
• Universal benefits are paid to all citizens/residents of the country
belonging to a certain pre-defined group such as children, pensioners,
unemployed people etc: they all receive the same payment by virtue of
their membership in that group.
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• Earnings-related benefits are paid to all those who fulfil the qualifying
condition and the working condition attached to the benefit. In other
words, earnings-related benefits are conditional on being affected by
a social risk such as old age or retirement, and on having contributed
towards the benefit while working. Earnings-related benefits are
sometimes flat-rate, i.e. the same amount is paid to everyone (e.g. in
Ireland), but in many countries the level varies according to the size
and duration of contributions so that for instance the longer one’s
working career and the larger one’s contributions, the larger the
benefit (e.g. pension).
• Means-tested benefits are paid to those who fulfil the (usually) stringent
conditions related to need and income level: they are intended to
prevent extreme forms of poverty by giving the bare minimum to those
whose market income falls below the poverty line, however defined. 
Means-tested benefits are common and constitute a large proportion of
social expenditure in countries that belong to the liberal model of social
protection. In this model, emphasis is placed on the duty of individuals and
families to take care of their social protection needs through private
insurances, informal help and other means such as savings. State
intervention is targeted at those who lack the necessary means to cover for
their social risks. Once it is established that their means fall below a certain
minimum level, they are entitled to safety-net assistance from the state. 
Table 2.7 reveals that expenditure on social benefits increased briskly
during the 1990s in Ireland, at roughly a third. Nonetheless, only 
some 10 per cent of social benefit expenditure in the EU (average for 
15 member states) was means-tested in 1998 (European Commission/
Eurostat 2000b: 29). 
Table 2.7 Expenditure on means-tested and non-means-tested
social benefits in Ireland, 1990-1998
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Social benefits, 
millions of IR£ 5102 5612 6177 6682 7104 7790 8082 8694 9293
Non-means-
tested (%) 68.1 67.5 66.3 65.9 65.0 65.9 65.6 67.0 68.3
Means-tested (%) 31.9 32.5 33.7 34.1 35.0 34.1 34.4 33.0 31.7 
Source: European Commission/Eurostat 2000b, p. 39.
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According to Esping-Andersen (1999: 75), the relative weight of means-
tested benefits compared to earnings-related and universal benefits
constitutes a good indicator of the ‘liberalism’ of a social protection
system. In the light of this measure, the Irish welfare state is very liberal.
It can be argued that means-tested benefits are very expensive to
administer because they require time-consuming investigation of the
recipient’s circumstances. It can also be argued that means-tested benefits
create work disincentives in a way that universal and earnings-related
benefits do not. Earnings-related benefits in fact create work incentives
because rights to benefits are given on the basis of employment history
and contributions. Lessening the emphasis on means-testing would have
a number of advantages, namely quicker and easier administration and
increased work incentives. Another problem with means-testing is the
periodic need to increase the qualifying income limits in accordance with
price or wage increases. This is often neglected with the result that fewer
and fewer people qualify for the payments.
A significant portion of means-tested social expenditure in Ireland
takes the form of qualified adult allowances and child dependant
allowances. It is questionable whether these expenditures should be
continued in their present form, given that they rely on an out-dated
model of women’s labour market participation and create poverty traps
for social welfare recipients.
The relative weight of services (benefits in kind) and income transfers
(cash benefits) is also an important indicator of the nature of the welfare
state. The Nordic countries tend to be relatively ‘service heavy’ in that they
spend a larger share of their social expenditure budgets on services than
most other countries. In this respect, too, the Irish welfare state is a liberal
or residual one. Expenditure on services is among the lowest in the EU
and some 2 percentage points below the EU average (see Table 2.8).
Increased investment in services would be needed in order to respond to,
among other things, the reduced capacity of families, i.e. women who are
increasingly employed outside the home, and to provide free care
services to young, disabled and elderly members of their families
(Timonen and McMenamin 2002).
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Table 2.8 Social benefits as a percentage of GDP, 1998
Old-age Benefits Other cash Total 
pensions in kind benefits benefits
EU-15 12.6 8.3 5.8 26.6 
Belgium 12.1 6.7 8.1 26.9
Denmark 10.9 10.9 7.2 29.1
Germany 12.9 8.6 6.7 28.2
Greece 12.5 7.5 3.7 23.7
Spain 10.7 6.1 4.3 21.0
France 13.3 9.7 5.9 28.9
Ireland 4.1 6.2 5.0 15.3
Italy 14.7 5.5 4.1 24.3
Luxembourg 12.1 6.4 4.7 23.2
Netherlands 13.3 7.9 5.7 26.8
Austria 14.1 8.1 5.3 27.5
Portugal 10.6 7.4 2.5 20.4
Finland 11.2 8.6 6.5 26.4
Sweden 12.5 13.3 6.8 32.6
United Kingdom 10.8 9.1 6.0 26.0 
Benefits in kind: in-patient and out-patient care, accommodation for old and disabled
people, day centres etc.
Source: Eurostat 2001.
It is clear from the above discussion, and from recent debates on issues
such as health care, child care and care for people with disabilities, that a
reassessment of public service spending in Ireland is needed. Before such
re-assessment is possible, however, data are required on the nature and
extent of public service spending in the country. As has been highlighted
above, no such data exist at present. Public service expenditure needs to
be systematically collated. It then needs to be broken down by category of
spending, e.g. health, care services for children, care services for older
people, etc. Within these categories, a further break-down by the nature
of expenditure, e.g. capital investments, wages, other running costs, etc is
required. In other words, comprehensive data on the ‘service state’ in
Ireland are needed before re-allocation decisions are made. Such data
would also enable comparisons over time, e.g. How much has expenditure
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increased? Has the bulk of the increase taken place through wage
increases?
Public funding of services has traditionally been relatively low in
Ireland. Arguably social spending on services such as health and
education is of great significance for equalising life chances and
employment potential, as well as for the economic competitiveness of a
country. Consequently, expenditure on services, whether direct or indirect
(in the form of tax reliefs), should be aimed at minimising the inequalities
that exist in health and education outcomes between different socio-
economic groups. At present, the Irish social expenditure system is not as
well geared towards achieving this aim as it should be. Expenditure on
services is an area in which major changes are both necessary and
politically possible. 
This section of the study concludes with the following brief summary of
the main characteristics of social spending in Ireland: Irish social
expenditure increased in real terms throughout the 1990s, and continues
to increase. The increase for 2000 was 6.9 per cent over 1999
(Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs, 2001: 2).
However, the proportion of GNP/GDP devoted to social expenditure has
been decreasing, and the Irish welfare state continues to exhibit the
defining characteristics of the residual, or liberal, welfare state model.
Many ‘old’ features – support for family carers, predominance of means-
tested payments, relatively low, flat-rate social insurance payments –
continue to exist and in some cases have been reinforced recently. While
some ‘new’ elements – improved universal benefits, statement of intention
to link benefit increases to wages and inflation, lessening of means-
testing, increasing qualified adult allowances – have been introduced, the
Irish welfare state still remains focused on poverty prevention and is weak
in the area of service provision. This is reflected in the allocation of social
expenditure between cash transfers and services: Ireland spends a
comparatively low proportion of its total net social expenditure on
services. 
We will now turn to a more detailed examination of social spending
in Ireland, focusing on old age, health, unemployment and children.
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EXPENDITURE BY FUNCTION: OLD AGE, HEALTH, UNEMPLOYMENT AND
CHILDREN
Old age
In 1997, on average across the OECD countries, 58 per cent of all cash
benefit expenditure was dedicated to old-age cash benefits and survivors’
benefits (OECD 2000). In most OECD countries, public pension spending
exceeds spending on the working-age population: the exceptions to this
are Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the Nordic
countries (Adema 2001: 8).
As in most other countries, expenditure on ‘old age’ forms the single
largest area of social welfare expenditure in Ireland. In 2000, over one
quarter of all social welfare expenditure was related to old age
(Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs 2001: 2).
Aggregate expenditure on old age has increased considerably in Ireland
in the 1990s, but the GDP share of old-age expenditure has decreased
(see Table 2.9). This is in accordance with the overall pattern that we
identified above. The table shows that the difference in old-age spending
is striking between Ireland and the rest of the EU. No other EU country
comes anywhere close to Ireland’s low expenditure/GDP ratio in this area.
Table 2.9 Expenditure on old age, 1980-1998, percentage of GDP
Country 1980 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Belgium 6.7 7.6 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.4* 8.2* 
Denmark 9.5 10.2 10.7 11.8 11.8 11.9 11.7 11.2 
Germany 10.8 10.6 10.8 10.9 11.3 11.4 11.4* 11.4* 
Greece .. 9.3 9.0 8.9 9.2 9.5 9.8 10.4* 
Spain 6.2 7.6 8.7 8.7 8.8 9.0 9.0* 8.8* 
France 8.1 9.5 10.5 10.4 10.8 11.0 11.0 11.0*
Ireland 4.7 4.2 4.2 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.1 2.9 
Italy 8.3 11.3 12.7 13.1 12.3 12.6 13.1 13.0* 
Luxembourg 8.0 9.1 9.8 9.6 9.9 9.7 9.6 9.2 
Netherlands 7.5 9.9 10.1 9.7 9.5 9.6 9.6* 9.6* 
Austria 9.0 10.0 10.5 10.8 10.9 10.9 10.6 10.4 
Portugal 3.7 4.8 6.1 6.2 6.8 7.1 7.0 7.2* 
Finland 6.0 7.2 9.5 9.2 8.9 9.2 8.5 8.0* 
Sweden .. .. 13.0 12.6 12.0 12.4 12.3 12.1 
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Country 1980 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
UK .. 9.0 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.5 10.6 10.4* 
EU .. .. 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.9 10.9* 10.8*
* = Estimated or provisional data.
Sources: European Commission/Eurostat 2000b, p. 86 and Statistics Sweden 2001,
p. 23.
Between 1991 and 2000, the number of recipients of Old Age
Contributory Pension rose by 13,453 whereas the number of recipients of
Old Age (Non-Contributory) Pensions fell by 25,298 (Department of
Social, Community and Family Affairs 2001: 22). This shift from non-
contributory to contributory pensions is a sign of the fact that more and
more retirees have a work history and are therefore entitled to insurance-
based pensions which are slightly higher than social assistance pensions. In
this way, a change in the number of people entitled to a benefit can in itself
bring about an increase in social expenditure without any benefit increases
taking place (although in the case of pensions there have been several
increases). This is sometimes referred to in the literature on welfare states as
‘maturation’ of social programmes. Table 2.10 illustrates the shift away
from non-contributory and towards contributory pensions expenditure.
Table 2.10 Expenditure on old age by pension type 
Year Contributory Non-contributory Total (A millions) 
Percentage Percentage
1991 59.5 40.5 1054 
1995 62.0 38.0 1223 
2000 69.0 31.0 1707 
Source: Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs 2001: 23.
Ireland’s low social expenditure is partly a result of its low old-age
dependency. However, the exclusion of this category of expenditure still
leaves Irish expenditure below the EU average, although higher than
spending in Spain, Italy and Greece when expenditure is calculated in
GDP terms, and in Portugal when Irish expenditure is calculated as a
percentage of GNP (O’Connor 2002) (see Table 2.11).
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Table 2.11 European Union countries: social protection
expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Country 1997 1997 1998 1998
Total social Excluding Total social Excluding
protection expenditure protection expenditure
expenditure on old age expenditure on old age 
and survivors and survivors 
EU-15 28.1 15.4 27.7 15.0 
Belgium 28.1 16.0 27.5 15.7 
France 30.8 17.4 30.5 17.1 
Germany 29.5 17.2 29.3 16.9 
Italy 25.7 9.0 25.2 9.1 
Luxembourg 24.8 14.0 24.1 13.4 
Netherlands 29.4 18.3 28.5 16.8 
Denmark 30.5 18.5 30.0 18.5 
Ireland GDP 17.2 12.9 16.1 12.1
GNP 19.3 14.5 18.1 13.6
United Kingdom 27.3 16.2 26.8 15.0 
Greece 23.6 11.5 24.5 11.6 
Portugal 22.5 12.9 23.4 13.4 
Spain 22.0 10.7 21.6 11.6 
Austria 28.8 15.0 28.4 14.7 
Finland 29.3 19.4 27.2 17.8 
Sweden 33.6 20.3 33.3 20.2 
Source: O’Connor 2002.
As was pointed out above, tax expenditure plays an important role in a
number of countries, including Ireland. ‘Tax expenditure’ is expenditure made
through the tax system and the concept highlights the fact that the tax system
can be used to achieve goals similar to those of public spending
programmes. Accounting for the costs and benefits of tax measures is often
very difficult because of the absence of reliable statistical data. Tax breaks
towards pensions are comparatively high in Ireland. In 1997, tax breaks
towards pensions amounted to 2.4 per cent of GDP in Ireland. Other high
spenders in this category were Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom
(Adema 2001: 23). In all of these countries, the high level of tax breaks
towards pensions provision is a result of the very low level of public pensions.
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Hughes (2001) compared the trend in the cost of tax expenditure on
occupational pensions with the trend in the cost of direct expenditure on
social welfare pensions in Ireland. He demonstrated that the cost of tax
expenditure grew from approximately 10 per cent of the cost of social
welfare pensions in 1980 to around 66 per cent in 1997 (see Table 2.12).
The amount of Exchequer support for the average participant in an
occupational scheme rose from one quarter to more than one-and-a-half
times the Exchequer expenditure on the average participant in a social
insurance scheme. Whereas in the tax year of 1980/81 the cost of tax
reliefs on employee and employer contributions and on the net income of
superannuation funds was 0.33 per cent of GNP, by 1997/98 this had
risen to 1.42 per cent (Hughes 2001: 7). Interestingly, this was at a time
when the proportion of GNP/GDP devoted to most forms of direct social
welfare expenditure was decreasing.
Table 2.12 Direct expenditure and tax expenditure on state and
occupational pensions, A millions
Direct Direct Total direct Tax Tax
expenditure  expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure
on contributory on non- on state on occ. on occ. 
old age pension contributory pensions pension pensions as 
and retirement old age schemes percentage of 
pension pension direct exp. on 
state pensions 
1980 194.3 178.0 372.3 38.1 10.2 
1985 446.6 347.3 793.8 67.3 8.5
1990 590.3 382.8 973.1 254.0 26.1 
1995 758.3 392.1 1150.4 506.6 44.0 
1997 839.6 402.3 1241.8 822.8 66.3
Source: Hughes 2001: 11. 
Most of the benefit of tax expenditure on occupational pensions is
concentrated at the upper end of the income distribution. The ESRI Living
in Ireland survey (Callan et al. 1994) shows that the coverage of
occupational pension schemes is virtually complete for the highest three
income deciles. However, only 10-35 per cent of employees in the
second, third and fourth deciles have coverage, and there is virtually no
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coverage for the lowest income decile. This is a good illustration of the
‘upside-down’ nature of tax expenditure (Hughes 2001: 15).
Health
The decade of the 1980s was a period of contraction in health spending
in Ireland. Between 1980 and 1989, gross non-capital health expenditure
increased by 95 per cent in nominal terms, but in constant terms (at 1995
prices) health expenditure declined by 7 per cent during this period.
Between 1990 and 2000, however, health expenditure increased by 180
per cent in current terms and by 79 per cent in constant terms (Wiley
2001: 69).
As can be seen from Table 2.13, health expenditure varies
considerably between OECD countries. It is important to note that high
health expenditure is not necessarily the result of extensive public services.
The United States, where the private health care sector plays an important
role, has one of the highest health expenditure/GDP ratios in the world.
US health expenditure is significantly higher than in many countries
where the system of financing and providing health care is public, and
where health outcomes are more equal. In other words, there is no
necessary or automatic connection between the health care system and its
cost: some largely privatised systems are very expensive, and others that
are funded through tax revenue are relatively cheap. High cost of health
care does not necessarily translate to equal access to health care. In fact,
the United States, with its very expensive health care system, produces
very unequal access to health care.
Table 2.13 Total expenditure on health, percentage of GDP
Country 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
Ireland 3.6 4.0 5.1 7.4 8.4 7.6 6.7 7.3 6.8 
Germany 4.8 5.1 6.3 8.8 8.8 9.3 8.7 10.2 10.3 
Spain 1.5 2.5 3.6 4.7 5.4 5.4 6.6 7.0 7.0 
Sweden 4.5 5.3 6.9 7.6 9.1 8.7 8.5 8.4 7.9 
UK 3.9 4.1 4.5 5.5 5.6 5.9 6.0 7.0 6.8 
US 5.1 5.6 6.9 7.8 8.7 10.0 11.9 13.2 12.9 
Source: OECD Health Data 2001b.
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In the case of health expenditure – and indeed all public service
expenditure – it must be noted that labour costs form a significant share
of total expenditure. Approximately two-thirds of health expenditure is
attributable to labour costs (Wiley 2001: 76). Rapid wage inflation may
create the impression that investment in health has increased significantly,
whereas the additional expenditure may in fact have been absorbed by
increased wages rather than new hospital beds, for example. Between
1990 and 2000, the number of people employed in the health sector in
Ireland increased by around 39 per cent, from almost 59,000 in 1990 to
approximately 81,500 in 2000. The category of employment that grew
fastest – by 86 per cent – was ‘management and administration’. 
Total health expenditure can be broken down into public expenditure
and private expenditure on health insurance.
Table 2.14 Public expenditure on health, percentage of GDP
1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
Ireland 2.8 4.2 6.8 5.8 4.8 5.3 5.2 
Germany 3.2 4.6 6.9 7.2 6.7 8.0 7.8 
Spain 0.9 2.3 4.3 4.4 5.2 5.5 5.4 
Sweden 3.3 5.9 8.4 7.9 7.6 6.9 6.6 
UK 3.3 3.9 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.9 5.7 
US 1.2 2.1 3.6 4.0 4.7 6.0 5.8 
Source: OECD Health Data 2001b.
Table 2.15 Private insurance, percentage of total expenditure on
health
1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998
Ireland .. .. .. 8.3 8.4 8.3 
Denmark .. 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.2 1.5 
Germany 7.5 5.9 6.5 7.2 6.7 7.1
Portugal .. .. 0.2 0.8 1.4 .. 
UK 0.9 1.3 2.5 3.3 3.2 3.5 
US 21.9 28.4 31.0 34.1 33.2 33.5 
Source: OECD Health Data 2001b.
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The proportion of health care financed by private insurance has increased
in many countries, while remaining fairly stable in others. The amount of
private insurance involved in financing health care in Ireland remained
very stable throughout the 1990s (see Table 2.15).
Tax expenditure plays an important role in financing health care in
Ireland. The cost of tax relief in respect of private medical insurance
premiums during the 1998/99 tax year was over A75 million (Revenue
Commissioners 2001: 59). It is interesting to compare this with ‘direct’
expenditure on social transfers. For instance, some A57 million was spent
on Carer’s Allowance in Ireland in 1998; the total cost of the Family
Income Supplement scheme was under A37 million in that year, and
maternity benefits amounted to a little over A48 million (Department of
Social, Community and Family Affairs 2000: 4). Such allocation of
resources clearly involves a conscious political decision to channel money
to subsidising private insurances instead of spending it on public transfer
payments. Moreover, the benefit of the tax relief on private medical
insurance accrues disproportionately to higher income groups – as does
tax relief on private pensions. 
Unemployment and employment supports
Unemployment expenditure in Ireland declined in tandem with a decrease
in unemployment during the latter half of the 1990s. As with pensions, the
structure of expenditure shifted somewhat from social assistance
(unemployment assistance) towards social insurance payments
(unemployment benefit). However, expenditure on both unemployment
benefit and unemployment assistance was lower in 2000 than in 1991.
Expenditure on unemployment benefits declined by approximately 2 per
cent during this period, whereas the decrease in unemployment assistance
was nearly 40 per cent (Department of Social, Community and Family
Affairs 2001: 57).
Employment supports include a variety of schemes designed to assist in
(re)integration into the workforce or to supplement low incomes from work.
These include Family Income Supplement (FIS), Back to Work Allowance,
Back to Education Allowance, and a range of smaller schemes.
Expenditure on Family Income Supplement grew significantly during the
1990s, from approximately IR£10 million (A12.7 million) in 1991 to over
IR£30 million (A38 million) in 2000. Even before Farm Assist (an income
supplement for low-income farmers) was included under expenditure on
other, non-FIS, employment supports, expenditure growth in this area was
Irish Social Expenditure in a Comparative International Context
28
notable. In 1991, only a little over IR£1 million (A1.27 million) was spent,
whereas in 1998 expenditure amounted to nearly IR£130 million (A165
million) (Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs 2001: 69).
Despite significant reduction in unemployment in the 1990s,
expenditure on unemployment still constitutes a relatively high proportion
of Ireland’s GDP. In fact, this is one of the very few areas of social
expenditure where Ireland exceeds the EU average (see Table 2.16).
Table 2.16 Unemployment expenditure, percentage of GDP
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Belgium 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4* 3.3* 
Denmark 5.6 5.2 4.6 4.2 3.7 3.4 
Germany 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.5* 2.5* 
Greece 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1* 
Spain 5.2 4.4 3.7 3.2 3.0* 2.8* 
France 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2* 
Ireland 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.3 2.8 2.4
Italy 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7* 
Luxembourg 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 
Netherlands 2.9 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.5* 1.9* 
Austria 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 
Portugal 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0* 
Finland 5.4 5.1 4.4 4.3 3.8 3.2* 
Sweden 4.5 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.0 
UK 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.9*
EU-15 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0* 1.9* 
* = Estimated or provisional data.
Source: Statistics Sweden 2001, p. 26.
One of the significant structural changes in social expenditure in Ireland
over the period 1990-2000 was the greater focus on active, as opposed
to passive, supports for the unemployed. Between 1991 and 1996, public
expenditure on labour market programmes increased from 1.31 to 1.66
per cent of GDP (OECD 1997b and 1999b). While this was somewhat less
than in Sweden and other Nordic countries that spend significantly in this
area, it was considerably higher than in most other European countries.
Social expenditure in Ireland 1960-2000 
29
However, Ireland has not supplied data on 1997 and subsequent years to
the OECD and it is therefore not possible to put Ireland’s investment in this
area in a comparative perspective over the last five years.
Family Income Supplement is a good example of an employment
support designed to benefit those on low wages while avoiding the
negative incentive effects created by most means-tested payments. Table
2.17 illustrates the considerable growth in the number of recipients and
resources devoted to this form of labour market support.
Table 2.17 Family Income Supplement: Expenditure and number
of recipient families, 1990-2000
Year Expenditure A000s Recipient families 
1990 11,103 6,569 
1991 13,167 7,157 
1992 16,038 7,735 
1993 20,872 9,605 
1994 26,442 10,671 
1995 27,078 11,398 
1996 27,792 11,847 
1997 32,999 12,888 
1998 36,386 13,143
1999 41,134 14,549 
2000 39,386 
Source: Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs 2000 and 2001.
The shift from passive towards active income support in unemployment
payments and other social welfare payments is a welcome development. As
this report shows, the Irish welfare state, in keeping with the liberal welfare
state model, has been very heavily focused on means-tested benefits.
Lessening means-testing and providing income support for working people
and families, along with appropriate help in training and seeking work,
often creates increased work incentives and opportunities for groups such
as lone parents and the long-term unemployed. As unemployment has
fallen, more people have also gained entitlement to contributory payments
and would therefore benefit from further improvements in these benefits.
Good contributory benefits also create work incentives and increase the
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recipient’s independence during periods outside the labour force.
Child-related expenditure
Child-related payments include Child Benefit, Orphan’s Pensions and
maternity-related payments such as Maternity Benefit, Adoptive Benefit and
Health and Safety Benefit. Between 1999 and 2000, expenditure on these
payments increased by almost 13 per cent, largely as a result of increases
in child benefit. Expenditure on child benefit increased by more than 130
per cent between 1991 and 2000 (see Table 2.19). This is the result of
determined campaigning by a number of organisations, as well as
extensive Irish and international research that has demonstrated both the
prevalence of child poverty in Ireland and the long-term negative influence
of poverty experienced in childhood. The government’s increased
expenditure in this area is also partly to offset the rising costs of child care. 
Table 2.18 Expenditure on families/children, percentage of GDP
Country 1980 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998
Belgium 3.1* 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3* 2.2*
Denmark 2.9 3.3 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.8
Germany 2.5 1.8 2.1 2.8 2.9* 2.8*
Greece .. 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9*
Spain 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4* 0.4*
France 2.9* 2.5 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.8*
Ireland 1.7* 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9
Italy 1.4* 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9*
Luxembourg 2.6 2.3 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.3
Netherlands 2.6* 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.3* 1.2*
Austria 3.3 2.7 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.8
Portugal 0.9* 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1*
Finland 1.9 3.3 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.4*
Sweden .. .. 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.5
UK .. 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2*
EU-15 .. .. 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.2*
* = Estimated or provisional data. 
Source: European Commission/Eurostat 2000b, p. 88.
Improvements in the welfare of children are particularly valuable as
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children represent an investment in the future, and as such can lead to a
reduction in the need for (often very expensive) social interventions in
later life. Child benefits have been chosen as the main tool in the fight
against child poverty in Ireland. Evaluating the effectiveness of this
approach is not possible within the scope of this report, but it is clear that
these efforts at reducing child poverty would be greatly aided by
increased service expenditure in areas such as early education, child
care, and health expenditure. 
Table 2.19 Expenditure on child benefits, A millions
Year Expenditure 
1991 274 
1992 278 
1993 294 
1994 337 
1995 382 
1996 477 
1997 505 
1998 531 
1999 565 
2000 637 
Source: Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs 2001: 37.
SOCIAL PROTECTION FOCUS
In the EU-15, expenditure connected with the family, housing and social
exclusion has for many years been gaining ground over expenditure on
health, disability and unemployment. Despite this trend, Old age and
survivors, and Sickness, health care and disability remain the two largest
areas of expenditure (see Table 2.20). 
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Table 2.20 Social benefits by group of functions in 1999 (as
percentage of total social benefits)
Old age Sickness, Families Unemployment Housing, 
and health care, and children social
survivors disability exclusion 
EU-15 46.0 34.9 8.5 6.8 3.8
Belgium 43.0 33.6 9.1 12.1 2.2
Denmark 38.0 31.7 13.0 11.2 6.1
Germany 42.1 36.0 10.5 8.8 2.6
Greece 50.7 31.0 7.6 5.7 5.0
Spain 46.2 37.0 2.1 12.9 1.9
France 44.2 34.0 9.8 7.4 4.6
Ireland 25.2 45.3 13.0 11.1 5.4
Italy 64.0 30.0 3.7 2.2 0.2
Luxembourg 41.4 39.5 15.5 2.5 1.1
Netherlands 41.5 40.7 4.3 6.2 7.4
Austria 47.4 35.4 10.3 5.4 1.6
Portugal 43.7 45.6 5.2 3.7 1.8
Finland 35.1 37.2 12.8 11.3 3.7
Sweden 39.5 36.9 10.5 8.1 4.9
UK 46.1 34.8 8.8 3.2 7.0
Sickness/health care: includes inter alia paid sick leave, medical care and supply of
pharmaceutical products. Disability: includes i.a. disability pensions and the provision
of goods and services (other than medical care) to the disabled. Old age: includes i.a.
old-age pensions and the provision of goods and services (other than medical care) to
the elderly. Survivors: includes income support and support in connection with the
death of a family member. Family/children: includes support (other than medical care)
in connection with pregnancy, childbirth, maternity and the care of children and other
dependent family members. Unemployment: includes i.a. unemployment benefits and
vocational training financed by public agencies. Housing: interventions by public
agencies to help households meet the costs of housing. Social exclusion (not elsewhere
classified): includes income support benefits, rehabilitation of alcoholics and drug
addicts and various other benefits (other than medical care).
Source: Eurostat 2002.
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The Irish population is the ‘youngest’ in Europe. In 1999, nearly a third
of the population (31.4 per cent) was aged under 20 against an EU-15
average of 23.1 per cent. Whereas 16.1 per cent of the EU population
as a whole was aged over 65, only 11.3 per cent of the Irish population
belonged to this age group. Such disparity partly explains the small
proportion of total social expenditure that is devoted to old age
expenditure in Ireland. In the EU as a whole, expenditure on old age and
survivors amounts to almost half of all social expenditure. Pensions
expenditure absorbs the largest share of social expenditure in Italy, where
some 64 per cent of expenditure is devoted to this function. 
The proportion of total social expenditure spent on sickness, health
care and disability in Ireland is the second highest in the EU, with only
Portugal spending more on this area. In Portugal, Ireland and Finland,
expenditure on sickness, health care and disability functions exceeds
expenditure on the old age and survivors functions.
In 1999, 13 per cent or more of total social expenditure in Luxembourg,
Denmark and Ireland came under the heading of families and children.
This then appears to be the second ‘priority area’ of Irish social protection
in a comparative perspective. In contrast, in Spain, Italy and the
Netherlands expenditure on families and children accounts for less than
5 per cent of all social expenditure.
There are also significant differences between the member states in the
share of social expenditure linked to unemployment. Whereas more than
11 per cent of all expenditure in Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Ireland and
Finland is linked to this function, in Italy and Luxembourg less than 3 per
cent is spent on unemployment-related social protection. Despite its
relatively low unemployment levels, Ireland is among the three member
states that devote the greatest share of their social protection budgets to
unemployment-related benefits and programmes. Ireland also devotes a
comparatively large proportion of total social expenditure to housing and
to reducing social exclusion: this is probably due to the predominance of
means-tested (and therefore poverty/social exclusion-oriented) payments
in transfer expenditure.
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CHAPTER 3
CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL
EXPENDITURE – IRELAND IN A
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
There are no reliable longitudinal and cross-national data on total social
expenditure that includes service expenditure. There are, however,
comprehensive data on transfers (see Table 3.1). While this table does not
provide the full picture of social expenditure, it is nonetheless a useful
indication of the level of social expenditure in Ireland in comparison with
the EU average and the OECD average.
Table 3.1 Social security transfers, percentage of GDP, 1960-1994
1960 1968 1974 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Ireland 5.5 6.5 11.4 16.5 17.2 16.7 16.1 14.2 13.9 14.6 15.0 14.9 14.6
Total EU-15 9.7 12.4 13.3 17.7 17.6 17.4 17.1 16.9 17.1 18.0 18.8 19.7 19.7
Total OECD 6.9 8.5 10.6 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.2 13.2 13.6 14.3 15.1 15.6 15.5 
Source: OECD (1997a) Historical Statistics, 1960-1995, p. 71.
The most comprehensive comparative measure we have available on
social expenditure is net total social expenditure. The latest year for which
comparative statistics are available on this indicator is 1997. Tables 3.2
and 3.3 set out a variety of social expenditure measures for eighteen
OECD countries in 1997. It is revealing that net total social expenditure
in Ireland is the fourth lowest among these countries: only Japan, Korea
and New Zealand have a lower level of expenditure. 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that gross public social expenditure amounts
to more than one quarter of GDP in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. However, as has
been pointed out above, caution is needed in basing conclusions about
the size and comprehensiveness of the welfare state on gross expenditure
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figures. Voluntary private social benefits tend to play an important role in
countries where the extent of public social expenditure is relatively small
– Australia, Canada, Korea and the US. Pensions form an important
component of voluntary private social expenditure: pension payments
range from 1 to 4 per cent of GDP in (ascending order) Ireland, Italy,
Sweden, the UK, Australia, the Netherlands, the US and Canada. Private
social health benefits are most prevalent in the US, amounting to 4.2 per
cent of GDP (Adema 2001: 12) (see Table 3.4).
Table 3.2 Net social expenditure indicators, percentages of GDP, 1997
Aus Austria Belg Canada Czech R. Dk Fin Ger Ireland 
1. Gross 18.7 28.5 30.4 20.7 21.7 35.9 33.3 29.2 19.6 
public soc.exp. 
– Direct taxes 0.3 2.5 1.8 1.7 0.0 5.1 4.4 1.3 0.3 
and soc. 
contrib.s 
2. Net cash 18.4 26.0 28.6 19.0 21.7 30.8 28.9 27.8 19.3 
public soc.
exp. 
– Indirect taxes 0.8 3.0 2.8 1.3 2.5 4.1 4.2 2.3 2.5 
3. Net direct 17.6 23.0 25.8 17.8 19.3 26.7 24.8 25.5 16.7 
public soc.exp. 
+ T1 TBSPs 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 .. 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.3
similar to cash 
benefits 
– Indirect taxes 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 .. 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 
4. Net TBSPs 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 .. 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.2 
similar to 
cash benefits 
+ T2 TBSPs 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
towards current 
private benefits 
5. Net TBSPs 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.9 .. 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.4 
(not including 
pensions) 
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Aus Austria Belg Canada Czech R. Dk Fin Ger Ireland 
6. Net current 17.9 23.4 26.3 18.7 19.3 26.7 24.8 27.2 17.1
public soc.exp. 
7. Gross 1.2 0.9 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 1.3 0.0
mandatory 
private soc.exp.  
– Direct taxes 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.0
and soc. contrib.s 
– Indirect taxes 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
8. Net current 
mand. private
soc.exp. 0.9 0.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.0 
9. Net publicly 18.8 23.9 27.5 18.7 19.3 26.9 24.8 27.9 17.1
mandated 
soc.exp. 
10. Gross volunt. 3.4 0.9 1.0 4.8 0.0 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.8
private soc.exp. 
– Direct taxes 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
and soc.exp. 
– Indirect taxes 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 
11. Net current 3.1 0.8 0.9 3.5 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.5 
volunt. private 
soc.exp. 
12. Net current 4.1 1.3 2.2 3.5 0.0 0.8 0.9 1.6 1.5
private soc.
exp. (8+11) 
13. Net total 21.9 24.6 28.5 21.8 19.3 27.5 25.6 28.8 18.4
soc.exp. (6+12-T2) 
TBSP = Tax breaks for social purposes 
T1 = TBSPs similar to benefits in kind
T2 = TBSPs towards current private benefits 
Source: Adema (2001)
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Table 3.3 Net social expenditure indicators, percentages of GDP, 1997 
Italy Japan Korea NL NZ Norway Swe UK US 
1. Gross public 29.4 15.1 4.4 27.1 20.7 30.2 35.7 23.8 15.8
soc.exp. 
– Direct taxes and 2.9 0.2 0.0 4.4 1.9 2.6 4.4 0.4 0.4
soc. contrib.s 
2. Net cash 26.6 14.9 4.4 22.7 18.9 27.6 31.3 23.4 15.5
public soc.exp. 
– Indirect taxes 2.4 0.5 0.2 2.4 1.9 3.2 2.8 2.3 0.4 
3. Net direct 24.1 14.4 4.2 20.2 17.0 24.4 28.5 21.1 15.0
public soc.exp. 
+ T1 TBSPs .. 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. 0.3 0.3 
similar to cash 
benefits 
– Indirect taxes .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. 0.1 0.0 
4. Net TBSPs .. 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. 0.3 0.2
similar to 
cash benefits 
+ T2 TBSPs .. 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 .. 0.2 1.2
towards current 
private benefits 
5. Net TBSPs .. 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 .. 0.5 1.4
(not including 
pensions) 
6. Net current 24.1 14.8 4.6 20.3 17.0 24.4 28.5 21.6 16.4
public soc.exp. 
7. Gross 1.5 0.5 2.5 0.8 0.0 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.4
mandatory 
private soc.exp. 
– Direct taxes and 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
soc. contrib.s 
– Indirect taxes  0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0
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Italy Japan Korea NL NZ Norway Swe UK US 
8. Net current 1.1 0.5 2.1 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.3
mand. private 
soc.exp. 
9. Net publicly 25.2 15.3 6.7 20.8 17.0 25.1 28.7 21.9 16.8
mandated 
soc.exp. 
10. Gross volunt. 0.1 0.4 1.9 4.7 0.5 .. 3.0 3.8 8.4
private soc.exp. 
– Direct taxes and 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 .. 0.7 0.5 0.4
soc.exp. 
– Indirect taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 .. 0.3 0.5 0.2 
11. Net current 0.1 0.4 1.9 3.3 0.5 .. 1.9 2.9 7.8
volunt. private 
soc.exp. 
12. Net current 1.2 0.9 4.0 3.8 0.5 .. 2.2 3.2 8.1
private soc.exp. 
(8+11) 
13. Net total 25.3 15.7 8.6 24.0 17.5 25.1 30.6 24.6 23.4
soc.exp. 
(6+12-T2) 
TBSP = Tax breaks for social purposes
T1 = TBSPs similar to benefits in kind
T2 = TBSPs towards current private benefits 
Source: Adema (2001)
RECENT TRENDS IN LEVELS OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURE IN THE EU
Despite ongoing discussion on the ‘crisis of the welfare state’, the overall
trend in social expenditure in the EU is clearly upward. Whereas in 1990
EU countries spent on average 25.4 per cent of their GDP on social
protection, this had risen to 28.7 per cent in 1996 (European
Commission/Eurostat 2000a: 26). Social protection/GDP rates are highest
in the Nordic countries (32-35 per cent) and lowest in the Mediterranean
member countries (with the exception of Italy) and Ireland (19-23 per cent).
While there are still obvious disparities between EU countries, both in the
extent and division of social expenditure between different areas of social
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policy, the broad trend is that of covergence in expenditure levels. This is
due to the fact that in recent years, the largest increases have taken place
in those countries that traditionally have had lower levels of expenditure. As
will be shown below, Ireland forms an exception in this respect.
The EU-wide increase in social expenditure between 1990 and 1996
occurred for the most part during 1990-1993 which was a period of low
rates of GDP growth and increased unemployment in many EU countries.
Decrease in expenditure between 1993 and 1996 was most noticeable in
Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands, which all experienced high levels
of expenditure in 1993. This illustrates the importance of not relying on
‘crude’ expenditure rates as a guide to actual welfare state growth: the
expenditure/GDP ratio can fluctuate considerably due to changes in GDP.
Between 1990 and 1993 per capita social expenditure in the 15 EU
member states increased by approximately 4.1 per cent per year in real
terms. The rate of growth was particularly high in Portugal (12.8 per cent
per year) and in the UK (8.9 per cent per year). Greece is the only EU
country where per capita expenditure fell in real terms during this period.
Between 1993 and 1996, the average social expenditure growth rate
was only 1.6 per cent per year in the EU on average. Between 1996 and
1999 the expenditure growth rate also remained low at 1.5 per cent per
year. Rates of growth increased in all member states except Finland where
social expenditure fell in real terms. Greece and Portugal, in contrast,
recorded strong increases in their social expenditure. In 1999, social
expenditure growth accelerated in all member states and the rate of
increase in per capita expenditure in real terms was approximately 2.4
per cent in the EU on average (the only exception was Finland where per
capita spending remained stable in real terms) (Eurostat 2002).
Castles (2001b: 1) has established that in terms of total social
expenditure, Europe as a whole, and the countries currently constituting
the EU, are somewhat more similar to each other than are the countries
constituting a wider OECD grouping. However, this similarity is not
sufficient to warrant the label ‘European social policy model’. Castles also
found that ‘over time, there is a general tendency for there to be greater
coherence in total spending levels and in levels of expenditure on poverty
alleviation and health care, but lesser coherence in respect of levels of
social security spending’ (2001b:1).
In Table A (see Appendix), countries are grouped into ‘families of
nations’ (Castles 1993 and 1998) according to their geographical,
historical and linguistic affinities. The four families in Table A are: the
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English-speaking nations, and the countries of Scandinavia, continental
Western Europe and Southern Europe. Japan is in a category of its own. 
The figures in Table A do not provide evidence of a general process of
expenditure contraction between 1984 and 1997. In 1984, the total state
spending mean for these nations was 46.2 per cent of GDP; in 1997, it
was 45.2 per cent, a decline of just one percentage point of GDP over 13
years, hardly a sign of ‘the death of the welfare state’. Rather, Table A
demonstrates the great variety of the OECD public expenditure
experience, both in respect of levels of spending and of expenditure
change over time. The big spenders of the mid-1980s were to be found
in continental Western Europe and in parts of Scandinavia. The English-
speaking countries were split between middle-ranking and very low
spenders (Ireland being around the middle), while Southern Europe was
the most consistently low-spending grouping. By 1997, total state
spending in all the countries of continental Western Europe and
Scandinavia was in excess of 44 per cent of GDP, while the governments
in Southern Europe – with the exception of Greece and Italy – and in the
English-speaking world spent less. However, the English-speaking
countries had now changed places with the countries of Southern Europe
to feature as the most consistently low-spending family of nations. Ireland,
Belgium, Greece, the United Kingdom and Denmark experienced
expenditure contraction on a major scale during this period. Finland, Italy
and Spain in contrast experienced substantial expenditure growth
(Castles 2001a). In the Mediterranean and Nordic ‘families’ total
expenditure grew between 1984 and 1997, whereas strong contraction
took place in the liberal countries and slightly less dramatic reductions are
evident in the continental countries.
How has the composition of total public expenditure changed? Total
government expenditure comprises social as well as non-social
expenditure. Major items of non-social expenditure include public
education, defence, law and order, public infrastructural development,
public administration and public debt interest payments. The social
expenditure figures allow us to reject the hypothesis of a ‘race to the
bottom’. On the other hand, the figures for change in non-social spending
do clearly reveal a consistent pattern of decline in non-social areas of public
sector spending. There has been a marked differentiation of expenditure
trends, with spending on major social programmes ‘ring-fenced’ from other
areas that have been far more vulnerable to retrenchment pressures. This
general pattern holds in the case of Ireland, too: while the share of GDP
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devoted to social expenditure remained stable, the proportion devoted to
non-social expenditure declined (see Table 3.4).
Table 3.4 Levels and changes in total public social expenditure
and total public non-social expenditure as percentages of GDP
in nineteen OECD countries, 1984-1997
Country Social expenditure Non-social expenditure 
1984 1997 Change 1984 1997 Change 
Australia 13.7 18.1 4.4 22.7 15.1 -7.6
Canada 16.2 16.9 0.7 29.1 25.5 -3.6
Ireland 17.9 17.9 0.0 29.8 15.3 -14.5
United Kingdom 21.1 21.6 0.5 26.0 19.3 -6.7
USA 14.1 16.0 1.9 19.0 15.4 -3.6
Denmark 28.9 30.5 1.6 33.7 26.3 -7.4
Finland 22.3 29.3 7.0 17.9 22.5 4.6
Norway 19.7* 25.4 5.7 22.4 18.7 -3.7
Sweden 30.0 33.3 3.3 29.2 25.7 -3.5
Austria 24.3* 25.4 1.1 25.0 24.4 -0.6
Belgium 26.7 23.6 -3.1 34.0 27.8 -6.2
France 26.4 29.6 3.2 25.1 23.0 -2.1
Germany 23.6 26.6 3.0 23.8 21.5 -2.3
Italy 21.0 26.8 5.8 28.4 23.2 -5.2
Netherlands 30.2 25.1 -5.1 23.6 19.5 -4.1
Greece 16.9 22.2 5.3 26.2 28.2 2.0
Portugal 11.4 18.7 7.3 29.7 24.8 -4.9
Spain 17.8 20.9 3.1 17.4 19.0 1.6
Japan 11.4 14.4 3.0 20.9 20.6 -0.3
Mean 20.7 23.3 2.6 25.5 21.9 -3.6
Sources and Notes: Total public social expenditure supplied by OECD Secretariat from
Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). Total public non-social expenditure is derived by
subtracting social expenditure from total outlays from Table 1. 
* Data are for 1985.
Table 3.5 shows social spending as a percentage of total government
outlays in 1984 and 1997. In each of these nineteen OECD nations, social
expenditure constituted a higher proportion of total public spending in
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1997 than in 1984. In 1984, welfare state spending averaged 44.4 per
cent of total spending; by 1997, the figure was 51.3 per cent. As Castles
argues, these figures reveal that we are now in an era in which welfare is
the foremost priority of the vast majority of governments in industrially
advanced societies.
Table 3.5 Total social expenditure as a percentage of total
government outlays in nineteen OECD countries, 1984-1997
Country 1984 1997 
Australia 37.6 54.5
Canada 35.8 39.9
Ireland 37.5 53.9
United Kingdom 44.8 52.8
USA 42.6 51.0
Denmark 46.2 53.7
Finland 55.5 56.6
Norway 46.8 57.6
Sweden 50.7 56.4
Austria 49.3 51.0
Belgium 44.0 45.9
France 51.3 56.3
Germany 49.8 55.3
Italy 42.5 53.6
Netherlands 56.1 56.3
Greece 39.2 44.0
Portugal 27.7 43.0
Spain 50.6 52.4
Japan 35.3 41.1
Mean 44.4 51.3
Source: Castles (2001a).
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CHAPTER 4
FINANCING SOCIAL EXPENDITURE,
REDISTRIBUTION AND OPTIONS FOR THE
FUTURE
Financing social expenditure
There are three main ways in which social protection can be financed:
• through direct and indirect taxes imposed by the government on
incomes and consumption (tax financing or general government
contributions)
• through mandatory social insurance contributions by the employer
and/or the employee (social contributions, social insurance; in
Ireland: pay-related social insurance – PRSI)
• through voluntary contributions by individuals and/or their employers.2
The structures of funding social expenditure vary considerably between EU
countries. In the EU as a whole, most social expenditure – approximately
60 per cent – is funded through employee and employer contributions,
with general government contributions derived from taxes covering
approximately 35 per cent in 1999 (see Table 4.1 and Eurostat 2002).
However, in most EU countries social expenditure is either predominantly
tax-funded or social contribution funded. The share of employee and
employer contributions of funding is highest in Belgium, Spain, France, the
Netherlands and Germany. Conversely, taxes, i.e. general government
contributions, play the largest role in Denmark and Ireland where the
relative weight of taxes – as opposed to social security contributions – in
total receipts is around 65 and 60 per cent respectively. The UK,
Luxembourg and Sweden also rely heavily on tax-financing. However, as
financing through taxes gains ground in countries where it used to be
relatively low, the gaps in sources of financing are narrowing.
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2 Where this involves tax reliefs that are intended to encourage and support private
provision, the state is also involved through foregoing tax revenue that it would
otherwise extract.
There is no correlation between the funding structure and level of social
spending: there are high-spending and low-spending countries in both
categories. Social spending is predominantly contribution-financed in
Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Tax
financing plays a particularly important role in Denmark and Ireland, but
also in Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Table 4.1 shows that the
share of general government contributions has been rising while the share
of social contributions in financing social protection has been falling.
Table 4.1 Receipts of social protection by type (as percentage of
total receipts)
General Social contributions Other
government Total Employers Protected receipts
contributions persons
1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 
EU-15 28.8 35.7 67.1 60.6 42.5 37.9 24.6 22.7 4.1 3.7
Belgium 23.8 25.7 67.0 71.8 41.5 49.4 25.5 22.4 9.2 2.5
Denmark 80.1 65.2 13.1 28.5 7.8 9.2 5.3 19.2 6.8 6.4
Germany 25.2 32.8 72.1 65.0 43.7 36.9 28.4 28.1 2.7 2.3
Greece 33.0 28.6 59.0 61.1 39.4 37.7 19.6 23.4 8.0 10.3
Spain 26.6 26.8 71.3 69.2 54.4 52.2 16.9 17.0 2.5 4.0
France 17.0 30.4 79.5 66.8 51.0 46.5 28.5 20.3 3.5 2.8
Ireland 58.9 59.8 40.0 39.0 24.5 24.2 15.6 14.8 1.0 1.2
Italy 27.2 38.9 70.3 58.0 54.9 43.6 15.5 14.4 2.5 3.1
Lux’burg 41.5 46.9 50.5 49.1 29.5 24.7 21.0 24.4 8.1 4.0
Netherlands 25.0 15.3 59.0 65.8 20.0 28.4 39.0 37.4 15.9 18.9
Austria 35.9 35.0 63.1 64.3 38.1 37.4 25.1 26.9 0.9 0.7
Portugal 33.8 40.9 57.0 44.4 36.9 27.6 20.0 16.8 9.2 14.7
Finland 40.6 43.4 52.1 50.0 44.1 37.2 8.0 12.8 7.3 6.6
Sweden .. 48.9 .. 45.9 .. 36.3 .. 9.6 .. 5.2
UK 42.6 47.3 55.0 51.8 28.1 27.7 26.9 24.0 2.4 0.9 
No data on benefits and receipts available for Sweden for 1990-1992.
Source: Eurostat 2002.
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In 1999, nearly 60 per cent of social protection expenditure in Ireland
was financed by the Exchequer, i.e. through taxes, and almost 40 per cent
through the Social Insurance Fund, i.e. through contributions. The social
contributions in turn can be divided into the employers’ share (around 24
per cent of total funding) and employees’ share (around 15 per cent of
total share) (Eurostat 2002). Employers’ social security contributions’
share of total taxation was just over 8 per cent in 1997 in Ireland, while
the European Union average was almost 16 per cent (OECD 1999a: 83).
Total – employee and employer – social security contributions in Ireland
amounted to just under 13 per cent of total taxation in 1997, the EU
average being nearly 29 per cent (OECD 1999a: 79). In short, social
contributions play a considerably smaller part in financing the welfare
state in Ireland than they do in other European countries.
A comparatively large share of total taxation in Ireland is derived from
taxes on goods and services. In 1997, nearly 40 per cent of total taxes in
Ireland were taxes on goods and services, i.e. mostly consumer goods
and services such as clothes, food and haircuts (OECD 1999a: 89). The
EU average was just over 30 per cent. Unlike taxes on income, taxes on
goods and services (consumption) are regressive as they are heavier for
those on low incomes. For instance, a A10 value added tax on a grocery
bill is a larger proportion of a A100 income than of a A1,000 income. 
Corporation taxes have been reduced radically in Ireland over the last
10 years as part of a strategy aimed at attracting foreign investment.
Employers’ PRSI contribution has also been reduced recently from 12 to 10
per cent: the cost of this measure in lost revenue is around A347 million
per annum (Combat Poverty Agency 2002). However, this reduction in the
rate of employer PRSI rate has been more than compensated for by the
decision in 2001 to abolish the ceiling on employer PRSI contributions.
A shift from public to private benefits is sometimes advocated as a
solution to the difficulties that governments may have in financing social
expenditure when both tax increases and public sector borrowing appear
unpalatable. It is important to note, however, that while public and private
financing differ in many respects, their influence on the economy is
sometimes similar. For instance, a shift from public to private financing of
benefits is likely to lead to calls for higher wages as people need to meet
the cost of social protection from their own resources: this, of course,
affects labour costs in a similar way as taxes that were used to fund public
benefits (Adema 2001: 6).
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Table 4.2 Total tax revenue, percentage of GDP
1985 1990 1995 1998 1999 
Ireland 35.1 33.6 33.1 32.3 31.9 
US 26.1 26.7 27.6 28.9 ..
EU average 38.6 39.2 40.1 41.7 42.1 
Source: OECD (2001c, p.172).
There are, of course, many different factors that influence the level and
trend of tax-to-GDP ratios. The most important ones are: the extent to
which social or economic assistance is provided via tax expenditure, rather
than direct government spending; whether or not social security benefits
are subject to tax; the size of the underground economy; the time lag
between accruals and receipts of tax, the economic cycle and differences
in the measurement of GDP between countries (OECD 1999a: 28).
It is obviously meaningless to talk about increasing social expenditure
without analysing the implications and putting forward recommendations
regarding the changes required in the taxation system. Improving services
and providing more equitable access to services calls for, firstly,
decreasing and re-engineering tax relief on private insurances, and,
secondly, channelling more tax revenue to services.
THE REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURE
This section will examine the factors that influence the degree of
redistribution that is brought about through social spending. The most
important of these factors include: pre-transfer income inequality, tax
incentives for private social spending, and emphasis on means-tested vs.
universal transfers.
Not all social spending produces equal results. Two countries may
spend exactly the same amount on social protection but end up with very
different results. The redistributive impact of social expenditure depends
on a number of variables that include the following: 
• The income distribution that exists before redistribution through
transfers. For instance, high inequality of market incomes necessitates
more extensive social spending in order to achieve the low poverty
levels that are more easily obtained in countries with high pre-transfer
earnings equality. High and growing earnings inequality in Ireland in
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the 1990s would have necessitated increased levels of income taxation
(particularly on high-income earners) and/or more extensive social
transfers, if more equal post-tax, post-transfer distribution had been
the goal.
• The proportion of the population without market income. It is clear that
the larger the proportion of the jobless, and the longer the duration of
their unemployment, the greater the share of earned incomes that has
to be spent on maintaining the incomes of those who have no work
(see also O’Connell and Rottman 1992).
• The division of social spending between universal and means-tested
transfers. It has been shown that universalist welfare states are more
successful at bringing about low income inequality than transfer
systems that are based on means-tested payments (Korpi and Palme
1998). This is partly because universalist welfare states tend to have
larger social expenditure budgets than residualist welfare states:
means-tested benefits tend to be meagre and add up to modest
aggregate spending. Moreover, generous universalist benefits are
proportionately worth more for low-income individuals and
households, and in many cases low-income households receive a
larger proportion of universal benefits than high-income households –
as is the case with child benefits, for instance.
• The level of benefits. A welfare state may offer a wide array of
benefits, or even a lot of universal and earnings-related benefits, but
if these are of a low level in relation to earned incomes, their
redistributive impact is likely to be poor.
• Redistribution through tax credits and incentives tends to favour high-
income groups disproportionately as these groups are most likely to
invest in private pensions and health care.
As has been pointed out above, the level of social expenditure is influenced
by a plethora of factors such as the age structure of the population,
unemployment, patterns of household and family formation and income
inequality. As income inequality increases, more redistribution through the
tax and benefits system is required in order to bring about post-tax and
post-transfer income equality. Social expenditure would not be necessary if
everyone was employed and earning the exact same wage. The purpose of
social expenditure is essentially to lessen the inequalities created by the
market: where the inequality that is inevitably created by open markets
increases, the redistributive system has to work harder to bring about the
reductions in inequality that are deemed desirable.
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The relatively young population structure of Ireland means that the
demographic pressures on social expenditure in this country are not as
strong as in many other advanced capitalist countries. However, the
adequacy of social expenditure levels in Ireland is threatened significantly
by income inequality. If post-tax and post-transfer levels of inequality are
to be brought to a low level under conditions of relatively high (and
increased) inequality of market incomes, redistribution through social
expenditure – and the tax system – has to be extensive.
In many countries the tax system is an important part of the
redistrisbutive mechanism. There are two main ways in which the tax
system can become part of the social protection system. First, taxes can
be reduced on particular forms of income or types of household.3 For
instance, certain benefits and pensions may not be taxed, or may be
taxed at a very low rate. OECD statistics on net social expenditure cover
this tax expenditure under ‘direct taxation’. Second, tax breaks can be
used to act as ‘cash benefits’ or to stimulate provision and use of private
benefits and services. An example of this kind of ‘tax break expenditure’
would be tax advantages given to providers of private child-care facilities,
or tax reduction for people with private pension or health insurance cover.
While tax breaks for social purposes are comparatively small in
Ireland (Cantillon and O’Shea 2001), they nonetheless play an important
role in bringing about inequitable welfare outcomes, most notably in the
area of health care. Taxation is used as a tool to encourage and subsidise
certain kinds of behaviour, such as care work in the home and private
insurances. The tax system in Ireland is favourable to households that live
in owner-occupied accommodation and take private insurances against
social risks such as illness and old age. For this reason, it is important to
include tax allowances in the total social expenditure figure while bearing
in mind that redistribution through the tax system does not necessarily
bring about equitable redistributive results.
Social transfers other than pensions are heavily concentrated on low-
income individuals and households in Ireland (European Commission/
Eurostat 2000a: 30). This has given an incentive for the better-off to take
out private insurances that are in many cases sponsored by the state
through tax reliefs. This in turn has contributed to income inequality in
Ireland remaining stubbornly high. Favourable tax treatment of private
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3 NB. OECD includes in tax breaks for social purposes the value of tax advantages
towards dependent children. However, tax advantages for married people are not
included as they are not considered to serve a social purpose (Adema 2001: 21).
employer-sponsored health care plans in the US is worth almost 1 per
cent of GDP. While this tax relief creates an incentive for employers to
provide health benefits, it is also regressive – and therefore ‘anti-
redistributive’ – as it provides the greatest tax relief for those on highest
incomes (Adema 2001: 12).
The structure of social expenditure has extensive implications for the
redistributive effectiveness and political legitimacy of the welfare state.
Systems that rely strongly on voluntary private expenditure, and encourage
such expenditure through tax allowances, tend to produce less egalitarian
welfare outcomes. It is clear that ‘the greatest beneficiaries of tax
expenditure are those who have the least needs by any measure used in
social policy analysis’ (Sinfield 1997: 20). Perhaps the best example of this
is the US health care system where standards vary dramatically between
private care (financed through private insurance contributions) and a
skeletal public health care system (financed through taxes). In contrast,
countries that have encompassing transfer systems and services tend to
generate more egalitarian social outcomes along with greater political
support among the population as a whole (Korpi and Palme 1998).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main purpose of this study has been to clarify the concept of social
expenditure and to present recent developments in Irish social expenditure
in a comparative context. It has painted a picture of Ireland as a low-tax,
low-spending welfare state that is heavily focused on means-tested
benefits and primarily financed through taxation. It is important to note
that the contents of this study do not in themselves give rise to any
overarching recommendations. For instance, it is not appropriate merely
to call for a greater volume of social expenditure. As has been
demonstrated above, there are many different kinds of social expenditure,
and at the very least a choice would have to be made between, say,
means-tested as opposed to employment-based expenditure, tax-financed
vs. contribution based, service vs. transfer expenditure, and so on.
Possible ways of altering individual components of spending have been
outlined above under the relevant sections. However, this study has not
investigated in sufficient detail the structures, mechanism and outputs of
the Irish welfare state to warrant recommendations on how the welfare
system overall should be changed. It is intended first and foremost to serve
as an informative guide to those who want to gain an understanding of
social expenditure, and to add to their knowledge of the details of the Irish
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welfare system in making informed recommendations about future social
spending.
In addition to disagreements among social policy and economic
analysts over the effectiveness of various forms of redistribution, different
ideological positions are taken on the desirability of overall, and specific
forms, of social spending. The following is a good illustration of the kinds
of unresolved debate that are taking place regarding the desirable extent
of social expenditure. An OECD report on social expenditure published
in 1985 stated that ‘the share of social spending in gross national product
should not be allowed to increase; otherwise it could conflict with the aim
of sustained economic growth’ (OECD 1985: 7). It is arguable that this
belief has informed recent social and public policy making in Ireland.
However, the connection between economic growth and the extent of
redistribution is far from clear. A recent study by the OECD Social Policy
Division (Arjona et al. 2001) finds ‘no reliable evidence of links between
the final income distribution and growth’. The study makes a distinction
between ‘passive’ social spending which is prejudicial to economic
growth, and ‘active’ social spending which promotes growth. Among
other things, active social spending tends to promote labour supply and
counteracts pre-tax, pre-transfer income inequality by promoting labour
market participation and mobility. ‘Active’ spending consists of resources
devoted to helping people to find work, increase their skills and improve
their health. Empirically, there can be no doubt that many countries have
achieved high and sustainable economic growth despite spending heavily
on social protection, while others have performed well economically
though opting for more limited redistribution. 
It is clear that ‘the most deep-seated determinant of social expenditure
growth must be a government’s commitment to equity objectives …
together with the prevailing judgement as to the extent to which these
objectives can be pursued in the face of a trade-off between equity and
economic efficiency’ (OECD, 1985: 24). As the current study has shown,
the level and nature of social expenditure is the sum total of many
intertwined economic, demographic and social influences. It is important
to note, however, that social policy, and politics at large, is the product of
conscious political decisions that are guided by value judgments as much
as by rational calculations. 
It is sometimes argued, and in most cases implicitly, that Ireland does not
‘need’ a higher level of social expenditure because it has a relatively low
share of older people in its population, because it enjoys comparatively low
Financing social expenditure, redistribution and options for the future
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unemployment, and so on. It is true that a number of demographic and
economic factors have resulted in a lower level of expenditure than would
otherwise be the case. For instance, if there were more older people or if
unemployment was higher in Ireland, the level of social expenditure would
‘automatically’ increase. However, the high income inequality that has
emerged in Ireland (for a recent report see for instance Nolan et al. 2002)
is also a factor that ‘calls for’ higher social expenditure. As the differences
in low and high wages, and between benefit income and income from work
have increased, more redistribution through the benefit and tax system is
needed to prevent an increase in post-tax, post-transfer inequality. In a
society where the incomes derived from work – and social transfers – are
highly unequal, the redistributive system has to work harder to iron out
poverty and inequality. If there is a genuine commitment to combat poverty
and income inequality in Ireland, higher social expenditure is called for
under the current circumstances.
Irish Social Expenditure in a Comparative International Context
52
REFERENCES
Adema, W. (2001) Net Social Expenditure. Labour market and social policy –
Occasional papers no. 52. Paris: OECD.
Arjona, R., M. Ladaique and M. Pearson (2001) Growth, Inequality and Social
Protection, OECD Social Policy Division working paper, Paris: OECD.
Callan, T., B. Nolan, B. Whelan, C. Whelan and J. Williams (1996) Poverty in
the 1990s: Evidence from the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey, Dublin: Oak
Tree Press. 
Cantillon, S. and O’Shea, E. (2001) ‘Social Expenditure, Redistribution and
Participation’ in S. Cantillon, C. Corrigan, P. Kirby and J. O’Flynn (eds) Rich
and Poor: Perspectives on tackling inequality in Ireland, Dublin: Oak Tree
Press and Combat Poverty Agency.
Castles, F.G. (ed), (1993) Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in
Western Democracies. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
Castles, F.G. (1998) Comparative Public Policy: Patterns of Post-War
Transformation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Castles, Francis (2001a) ‘On the Political Economy of Recent Public Sector
Development’, Journal of European Social Policy 11(3): 195-211.
Castles, Francis (2001b) The European Social Policy Model: Progress since the
Early 1980s. Mimeo.
Combat Poverty Agency (2002) An analysis of the distributive and poverty
impacts of Budget 2002. Dublin: Combat Poverty Agency.
Department of Finance (1998) Tax strategy group papers 98/03A. Dublin,
Department of Finance.
Department of Health and Children (1999) Health Statistics 1999. Information
Management Unit, Department of Health and Children.
Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs (2000) Statistical
Information on Social Welfare Services, Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs (2001) Statistical
Information on Social Welfare Services 2000, Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Social Welfare (1991) Statistical Information on Social Welfare
Services 1990, Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Social Welfare (1996) Social Insurance in Ireland (October 1996).
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1999) Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
53
European Commission/Eurostat (2000a) The social situation in the European
Union 2000, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities.
European Commission/Eurostat (2000b) European Social Statistics. Social
Protection. Expenditure and Receipts, 1980-1998, Luxembourg: Office for
Official Publications of the European Communities.
Eurostat (2001) Statistics in Focus – Population and Social Conditions: Social
Protection: expenditure on pensions (by Giuliano Amerini), Theme 3 –
9/2001.
Eurostat (2002) Statistics in Focus – Population and Social Conditions: Social
Protection in Europe (by Gérard Abramovici), Theme 3 – 1/2002.
Fahey, Tony and John FitzGerald (1997) Welfare Implications of Demographic
Trends, Dublin: The Oak Tree Press in association with the Combat Poverty
Agency.
Hughes, Gerard (2001) The Cost and Distribution of Tax Expenditure on
Occupational Pensions in Ireland, Dublin: ESRI Working Paper No. 139.
Korpi, W. and Palme, J. (1998) ‘The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of
Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality and Poverty in the Western
Countries’, 63(5) American Sociological Review: 661-687.
Maguire, Maria (1984) ‘Components of Growth of Income Maintenance
Expenditure in Ireland, 1951-1979’, The Economic and Social Review 15(2):
75-85.
Nolan, B., B. Gannon, R. Layte, D. Watson, C.T. Whelan and J. Williams (2002)
Monitoring Poverty Trends in Ireland: Results from the 2000 Living in Ireland
Survey, Policy Research Series No. 45 (July 2002), Dublin: ESRI.
O’Connell, Philip J. and D. B. Rottman (1992) ‘The Irish Welfare State in
Comparative Perspective’, in J.H. Goldthorpe and C.T. Whelan (eds.) The
Development of Industrial Society in Ireland. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 205-239.
O’Connor, J.S. (2002) Welfare State Development in the context of European
Integration and Economic Convergence: Situating Ireland within the European
Union Context, Mimeo, University of Ulster.
OECD (1985) Social Expenditure 1960-1990 – Problems of Growth and
Control, Paris: OECD.
OECD (1996) Economies at a Glance: Social Indicators, Paris: OECD.
OECD (1997a) Historical Statistics, 1960-1995, Paris: OECD.
OECD (1997b) Employment Outlook (July 1997), Paris: OECD.
OECD (1999a) Revenue Statistics 1965-1998, Paris: OECD. 
OECD (1999b) Employment outlook (June 1999), Paris: OECD.
OECD (2000) OECD Social Expenditure Database, 1980-97, Paris: OECD.
OECD (2001a) Historical Statistics 1970-1999, Paris: OECD.
Irish Social Expenditure in a Comparative International Context
54
OECD (2001b) OECD Health Data, Paris: OECD.
OECD (2001c) OECD Economic Outlook, Paris: OECD, No. 69
Ó Riain, S. and P.J. O’Connell (2000) ‘The Role of the State in Growth and
Welfare’, in B. Nolan, P. O’Connell and C. Whelan (eds.) Bust to Boom? The
Irish Experience of Growth and Inequality, Dublin: Institute of Public
Administration, pp. 310-339.
Revenue Commissioners (2001) Statistical Report of the Revenue Commissioners.
Year Ended 31st December 2000. Dublin: the Stationery Office.
Sinfield, A. (1997) ‘Social Protection versus Tax Benefits’, in Social Protection of
the Next Generation in Europe, European Institute of Social Security. The
Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Statistics Sweden (2001) Social Protection Expenditure and Receipts in Sweden
and Europe 1993-1999, Stockholm: Statistics Sweden.
Timonen, V. and I. McMenamin (2002) ‘Future of Care Services in Ireland: Old
Answers to New Challenges?’ Social Policy and Adminstration 36(1), pp. 20-
35.
Wiley, Miriam M. (2001) ‘Reform and Renewal of the Irish Health Care System:
Policy and Practice’, in: Budget Perspectives – Proceedings of a conference
held 9 October 2001. Dublin: ESRI.
References
55
TERMS OF REFERENCE
Irish social expenditure in a comparative international context
(CR/2001/1)
The purpose of this study is to analyse Irish social expenditure in a comparative
context. Social expenditure plays an important role in alleviating market
inequalities and improving living standards. Ireland has a historically low level of
social expenditure, which now warrants review in the light of changing economic
circumstances. The objectives of the study are:
• To review the international policy context governing social expenditure,
including the factors influencing the level of social expenditure in different
countries
• To situate the level and composition of Irish social expenditure in a
comparative and historical policy context
• To review and comment on the level and composition of social expenditure in
Ireland, taking into account international norms, economic development, tax
base, demographics and social need
• To make recommendations on the future policy direction of social expenditure
in Ireland.
This study should be based on published international reports, analysis of social
expenditure in select countries and Irish data and policy reviews on social
expenditure.
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ANNEX
Table A: Social Spending Increases as percentage GDP, 1984-1997
Note: *1985 data: 1984 unavailable Source: cols. 2-7: Castles, 2001, updated by OECD
2001; cols. 8-13, OECD 2001. Countries are divided up into a conventional regime
categorisation. Some countries do not fit neatly into regime-type. For example, Italy displays
some Corporatist and the Netherlands some Social democratic characteristics.
Categorisation for Southeast Asian countries is at present underway
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Foreword
The Combat Poverty Agency is a statutory advisory agency
developing and promoting evidenced-based proposals and
measures to combat poverty in Ireland. Eliminating poverty
requires creating change to economic and social structures. This
is so that people in poverty have improved chances of benefit-
ing from better incomes and more life opportunities which will
enhance their living standards and social participation, and
reduce inequality in Irish society. Combat Poverty aims to
advance such chance in a variety of ways, including through
research and public education. This ‘Epilogue’ develops the
work undertaken for the Combat Poverty Agency by Dr Virpi
Timonen in the study Irish Social Expenditure in a Comparative
International Context. It makes a valuable contribution to
informing the debate about the nature and future direction of
the Irish welfare state.
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
Ireland has a comparatively low rate of social expenditure. The
term social expenditure refers not just to social welfare pay-
ments or income support, but also to expenditure on other
social areas such as health and education. 
Ireland’s economy has undergone a dramatic transformation
in the last decade. While this transformation has been well
analysed, the evolution of social expenditure and how it has
been influenced by it has received less attention. It is well
known that state provision of social welfare, and high quality,
efficiently delivered social services have a key role to play in
poverty reduction. 
It was in this context that the Combat Poverty Agency first
commissioned Dr Virpi Timonen to undertake Irish Social
Expenditure in a Comparative International Context, published in
2003. The study presented a clear definition of social expendi-
ture and compared Ireland’s approach to social expenditure
with that of other advanced industrial nations. It noted that out
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of 15 OECD countries in 1997, Ireland had the lowest net total
social expenditure after Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.
The study characterised the Irish tax and social expenditure
system as a ‘low tax, low spend’ system and consequently the
level of redistribution achieved through the system was also
relatively low. This also meant that the welfare system had to
‘work harder’ to achieve the same anti-poverty outcome as
other more redistributive systems.
Responding to concerns that some of the analysis in the
study was based on data produced prior to the full force of the
economic boom in Ireland, Dr Timonen was commissioned to
write an ‘Epilogue’ to Irish Social Expenditure in a Comparative
International Context. This short report builds on the earlier 
publication. It presents an analysis of the most up-to-date 
comparative data available on social expenditure in Ireland and
selected EU countries, and develops comprehensive policy
recommendations. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE ‘EPILOGUE’
The key issues addressed in the ‘Epilogue’ include: comparable
social expenditure trends; the relationship between wealth and
social spending; the adequacy of different levels of expenditure
in distinct policy areas; the relationship between inequality and
social spending; the linkages between social spending and
social outcomes; and proposals for social expenditure reform in
Ireland.
KEY FINDINGS
The ‘Epilogue’ confirms that, despite dramatic growth in real
terms, Irish social expenditure remains low by comparison to
most of the EU-15, even when factors such as the low proportion
of older people in the population are taken into account. The
comparative data show that there is a strong correlation between
social expenditure and income inequality: the higher social
spending countries tend to have lower levels of inequality. While
higher expenditure in itself does not guarantee desirable 
IRISH SOCIAL EXPENDITURE IN A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: EPILOGUE
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outcomes, the institutional structure of the welfare state, and the
precise structure of entitlements, can have a strong impact on
economic and welfare outcomes.1 Competitiveness and high
employment levels are not irreconcilable with higher social
expenditure and greater income equality. Positive economic out-
comes can be achieved with such a model.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Social expenditure in Ireland is below the level expected in a
country with Ireland’s economic wealth. While there may be
some historical reasons for this, the ‘Epilogue’ re-emphasises
that in countries with higher levels of market income inequality,
such as Ireland, more extensive social spending is required to
achieve the same outcomes as countries with a more equal
market distribution of income. Despite much increased wealth,
the gap between the poor and non-poor has continued to
increase steadily over time in Ireland. Some groups in the 
population are particularly affected by income poverty, such as:
older women, lone parents, and households without any one in
employment. These trends point to the need to examine the
balance between economic and social policy so that poverty can
be eliminated and a more equitable society achieved.
EMPLOYMENT
It is acknowledged that employment is a key mechanism of
poverty reduction and social integration. However, ensuring
high employment will not in itself eradicate poverty or social
exclusion. With an increasing number of households with
somebody working falling below the poverty line, the income
support mechanisms for low-income workers need to be
enhanced and their take-up encouraged. For example, the
Family Income Supplement needs to be reviewed with a view
to making it more comprehensive and adequate, and the take-
up more extensive.
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1 Atkinson, Anthony (1999) The Economic Consequences of Rolling Back the
Welfare State. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
To gain a foothold and remain in employment two types of
service are crucial: quality affordable childcare and training/
employment services that are flexible to meet the particular
needs of different groups, e.g. lone parents and people with 
disabilities.
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION
At any given time there will be individuals who are outside the
labour market, temporarily or permanently. The focus of the
Irish social system is poverty alleviation. Irish social transfers,
other than pensions, are heavily concentrated on low-income
individuals and households, mainly in the form of means-
testing. While means-tested benefits go some way towards 
alleviating the more extreme forms of poverty, systems that rely
strongly on means-tested payments tend to be less effective in
reducing poverty rates. Recent evidence suggests that welfare
states with a greater emphasis on insurance based or universal
systems are more successful in reducing poverty and income
inequality.2
SERVICE EXPENDITURE
While income support is important, it needs to be supplemented
by more equal access to services. Irish spending on social serv-
ices needs to better reflect its position as one of the wealthiest
countries in the world. The most urgent issues include more
equitable access to healthcare and the high cost of primary
health care as well as education and care services for children,
and older people, housing, and employment issues for vulner-
able groups. However, higher social expenditure on its own
may not be enough. There is also a need for a more people-
centred approach to service delivery, with more appropriate
and equitable institutional structures and entitlement systems.
Higher expenditure may require higher rates of taxation, and
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2 Bradshaw, J and Finch, N (2002) A Comparison of Child Benefit Packages in
22 countries – Research Report # 174, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office:
London.
broadening the tax base. NESC concluded in its recent strategy
statement that there is a ‘historic opportunity to now guide the
evolution of Ireland’s social assistance and social insurance 
system to align and converge into a truly developmental wel-
fare state that secures social inclusion while respecting eco-
nomic contingencies’.3
TAX EXPENDITURE
The ‘Epilogue’ highlights the revenue foregone in tax expendi-
tures and the inequitable nature of these. This calls for an
assessment of the extent and impact of tax expenditures in the
Irish tax and welfare system. Consequently, Combat Poverty
welcomes the review being undertaken by the government,
which was announced in Budget 2005. We look forward to the
publication of the outcomes of this work and the debate it 
generates.
DATA AND RESEARCH
The ‘Epilogue’ stresses the need for improving data both in
terms of its variety and its timeliness. This would mean that we
can understand better the dynamics and inter-relationships of
social and economic systems, so that we can make informed
choices about social expenditure.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This ‘Epilogue’ to Irish Social Expenditure in a Comparative
International Context, using the most recent data, confirms
Ireland as a low social spender within the 15 Member States. It
makes a convincing case for more investment in social expen-
diture. It sets out the areas that should be prioritised and makes
a number of policy recommendations.
The publication and dissemination of the ‘Epilogue’ makes
an important contribution to the public debate about the type of
social support system we want and the trade-offs involved.
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3 NESC (2003) An Investment in Quality: Services, Inclusion and Enterprise.
Dublin: National Economic and Social Council.
Based on the experience of other European countries, it is pos-
sible to create an economic and social balance that can work to
eliminate poverty and achieve equality in Ireland.
Combat Poverty
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1. Introduction
This report is an ‘epilogue’ to Irish Social Expenditure in a
Comparative International Context, published by the Combat
Poverty Agency in 2003. The report at hand builds on and con-
tinues the analysis in the earlier report and presents the most
up-to-date comparative data available on social expenditure in
Ireland and selected EU countries. The key questions that are
addressed in this report are as follows:
• Has social expenditure fallen, risen or remained stable in
Ireland over recent years? How does social expenditure in
Ireland compare to social expenditure in other European
countries?
• Is the current level of social expenditure justifiable? In other
words, is it appropriate to the context in which social
expenditure takes place?
• What is the relationship between wealth and social spend-
ing?
• How is social expenditure divided between different policy
areas, and does this allocation of resources to different areas
and policies respond adequately to current and possible
future needs?
• What is the relationship between inequality and social
spending? Does more social spending always result in more
positive social outcomes?
• In what ways might social expenditure in Ireland be
reformed to produce better outcomes?
These are clearly very broad issues that cannot be treated com-
prehensively in a short report. However, it is hoped that the
brief treatment of these topics offered here will give rise to more
detailed future research and will also contribute to ongoing pol-
icy debate on social policies in Ireland. 
The EU-15 will serve as the main point of comparison to Irish
social expenditure, presented both as percentage of GDP and in
1
Purchasing Power Standards. In addition to presenting the
most up-to-date social expenditure data, this report provides
other relevant data such as indicators of the extent of poverty
and inequality in the countries analysed. These data are used to
back up the policy recommendations that are included in the
last section of the report. The report contains a substantial dis-
cussion of possible structural reforms of Irish social expendi-
ture that can be undertaken with a view to bringing about
greater equality of incomes and opportunities. 
The discussion of policy options focuses on the particular
merits of service expenditure vis-à-vis transfer expenditure; the
central importance of investing in good career opportunities for
all population groups, particularly those who are currently
marginalised in terms of their labour market opportunities; and
the role that tax expenditure continues to play in absorbing
resources that could be used to pay for more universal services. 
DATA
It was suggested in some responses to Irish Social Expenditure in
a Comparative International Context that the report did not con-
tain sufficiently up-to-date expenditure figures to take into
account the full impact of the Celtic Tiger era, and that in the
light of the most up-to-date figures Irish social expenditure
compares more favourably with expenditure in other EU coun-
tries. At the moment, the most up-to-date, reasonably reliable
expenditure figures that are available relate to 2001. It is not
possible to quote reliable comparative expenditure figures for
later years, as figures for the years 2002-2004 are still highly
provisional.1
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1 Note, for instance, how an article by Lawlor and McCarthy published in
autumn 2003 presents comparative expenditure figures for the year 2003.
The fact that these figures are projections based on the early months of
2003 is not acknowledged in the article.
2. Has social expenditure 
in Ireland fallen, risen 
or remained stable over
recent years?
There are two main indicators of social expenditure that can be
used in comparative research: the share of social expenditure of
a country’s GDP or GNP and the amount of social expenditure
in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS). The first indicator pres-
ents social expenditure as a percentage share of the country’s
wealth measured in GDP or GNP terms. As such, the social
expenditure/GDP(GNP) figures are influenced both by changes
in social expenditure itself and by changes in the country’s
wealth. For instance, if a country’s economy grows very quickly
and social expenditure fails to keep up with this rate of growth,
the country appears to have spent less than prior to the period
of growth, even where absolute growth in social expenditure
has taken place (see Figure 1 illustrating the rapid growth in
Irish social expenditure in the 1990s). In other words, rapid
economic growth tends to suppress the levels of social expen-
diture as a share of national wealth and this is indeed one of the
reasons behind Ireland’s poor performance in the light of this
indicator (see Figure 2 ). 
It is very important to be clear about this difference between
absolute growth in social expenditure and changes in social
expenditure in relation to GDP/GNP. Note that the earlier
report did acknowledge the rapid growth that took place in
Irish social expenditure in absolute terms in the 1990s (Timonen
2003, p. 14). Note that Figures 1 and 2, despite appearing con-
tradictory, are in fact easily intellectually reconciled, as one
depicts fast growth in absolute terms and the other illustrates
the fact that this growth was not sufficiently fast to keep up
with economic growth. In fact, the apparent disparity between
3
Figures 1 and 2 is the main reason for the ‘paradox’ of increased
inequality at a time of rising general prosperity during the
Celtic Tiger years: as will be discussed below, the failure of
social welfare benefits to keep up with rising earned incomes is
the main underlying cause for the rise in inequality in Ireland
since the early 1990s.
Figure 1: Social expenditure in Ireland per capita at constant
prices (1992=100)
Source: Eurostat (2004).
It is sometimes argued that looking at social expenditure in
relation to GDP leads to a distorted image of Irish social expen-
diture, because a large proportion of the wealth created in
Ireland is ‘exported’ by multinational companies. In the case of
Ireland it would therefore be more appropriate to analyse social
expenditure in relation to GNP, which is an indicator of the
wealth that remains in the country. While it has to be acknowl-
edged that there is an unusually large difference between the
GDP and GNP of Ireland in comparison with most other coun-
tries, it is also clear that taking this difference into account does
not change the broader picture,2 and that there are also serious
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2 See Table 2.11 in Timonen (2003) which shows that Ireland remained the
lowest spender in the EU-15 in relation to both the GDP and GNP.
problems regarding comparative data availability as most com-
parative social expenditure data present expenditure in relation
to GDP, and not GNP.
Figure 2: Social expenditure in Ireland, percentage of GDP
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004).
A more effective way of circumventing this problem is to
analyse social expenditure in terms of Purchasing Power
Standards (PPS). PPS refers to an artificial common reference
currency unit that is used to express the volume of economic
aggregates for the purpose of comparisons in such a way that
price level differences between countries are eliminated. One
PPS buys the same volume of goods and services in all the
countries included in the comparison, whereas different
amounts of national currency are needed to buy the same vol-
ume of goods and services in individual countries.3
Figures 3 and 4 present total social expenditure as a share of
GDP and in PPS per capita in 2001. Ireland has a low level of
social expenditure in the light of both indicators. Measured as 
a share of GDP, Irish social expenditure is the lowest in the 
EU-15. Measured in PPS terms, Ireland’s total social protection
5
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expenditure is third lowest in the EU after Portugal and Spain.
As the 2003 report pointed out, even when tax expenditure,
taxes on social transfers and private expenditure are taken into
account (in other words, when ‘net’ social expenditure has been
calculated), the picture of the Irish welfare state as a low
spender remains unchanged (Timonen 2003, pp. 36-37; see also
Adema 2001). The most recent OECD estimates, for the year
2001, indicate that Irish social expenditure both as percentage
of GDP (at factor prices) and as percentage of GNP (at factor
prices) was among the lowest in the OECD. These statistics con-
firm that, regardless of the indicator used, Ireland is undeniably
a low spender in comparison not only to other EU countries but
also within the context of the broader OECD group of countries
(see www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure). 
Figure 3: Total social protection expenditure, percentage of GDP,
1992 and 2001
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004).
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Figure 4: Total social protection expenditure, per person PPS,
1992 and 2001 
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004).
Figure 5: Total social protection expenditure minus old-age
expenditure per capita PPS, 2001 
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004).
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It is frequently argued that, as Ireland has an unusual demo-
graphic structure, it would be more appropriate to compare
social expenditure excluding expenditure on old age. However,
as Figure 5 illustrates, excluding social expenditure on old age
does not significantly influence Ireland’s position in relation to
other EU countries because Ireland remains among the other
relatively low spenders.
HOW IS SOCIAL EXPENDITURE DIVIDED BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLICY AREAS?
Table 1 presents a breakdown of social expenditure by function. It
is interesting to note that Irish expenditure expressed as a share of
the EU average expenditure varies considerably across different
areas of expenditure. Whereas old-age expenditure in Ireland
amounts only to some 28 per cent of the average old-age expendi-
ture in the EU, Irish housing expenditure measured in PPS per
capita exceeds the average housing expenditure in the EU. Health
expenditure and expenditure on families and children in Ireland
was close to the EU average in 2001 and it appears that expendi-
ture in these areas is set to exceed the EU average. 
Table 1: Social expenditure by function, Ireland, EU-15 average
and selected countries, 2001, PPS per head of population
Total Sickness/ Disability Old age Family, Unempl. Housing
exp. Health Children
care
EU-15 6404.9 1730.3 493 2536.1 491.2 381.4 126.6 
Ireland 3875.2 1609.6 192.7 708.2 461.4 307.6 127.1 
Irish exp as 
% of EU-15 61 93 39 28 94 81 100.4 
Denmark 7805.1 1536.5 946.8 2877.1 1004.5 758.8 176.1 
Germany 7328.6 2029.7 546.5 2883.6 730.2 577.5 48.3 
Spain 3866.6 1131.3 285.2 1600.7 96.8 487.6 34.2 
Netherlands 7391.8 2098.2 797.1 2495.8 303.9 344.5 97.8 
UK 6180.7 1673.9 561.5 2542.2 403.8 171.9 333.7
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004).
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Note that Table 1 does not reveal the extent to which expendi-
ture under the same category in fact serves different purposes
in different countries. For example, a large share of disability
payments are in some countries made to people who in a dif-
ferent social policy system would receive unemployment sup-
ports. The figures in this table also exclude tax expenditure,
which plays a very important role in some countries, for
instance in the area of family support, through such assistance
as significant tax breaks for families with children.
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3. What is the relationship
between wealth and social
spending?
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between GDP (in PPS 
per capita) and social expenditure (PPS per capita) in the EU
countries. This graph demonstrates that Ireland is indeed a
very significant outlier in relation to the other EU countries. At
its level of national wealth, Ireland ‘should’ be spending 7,182
instead of 3,875.2, i.e. almost twice as much on social protection
as it does at the moment, were it to conform to the overall 
pattern evident among EU member states.4 Note the strong
relationship between GDP and social protection: social expen-
diture tends to increase as national wealth increases. This 
suggests that, generally speaking, the wealthier a country, the
more it spends on social protection (this is a well-established
correlation that also holds for a larger sample of countries). 
It is interesting to contrast this with the view, frequently put
forward in Ireland, that wealth generation and social spending
are fundamentally inimical. It is often argued that Ireland has
enjoyed healthy economic growth and low unemployment
resulting from the fact that it has not invested ‘excessive’
amounts in social protection and has not prioritised income
equality. According to this argument, social expenditure and a
high degree of income equality slow down economic growth and
can bring about or contribute to other undesirable economic
outcomes such as excessive deficit spending, government debt
and high unemployment. 
Examining the complex relationships between these variables
is clearly outside the remit of this report. However, comparative
research suggests that there is no general tendency for inequality
to influence economic growth either negatively or positively
10
4 Based on calculation y = 0.2858 x -671.54.
(Kenworthy 2003). It is clear even from very superficial obser-
vation that many ‘high spenders’ in the EU have also achieved
very healthy economic indicators such as low unemployment,
high economic growth rates, low levels of debt, competitive-
ness etc.
Figure 6: Social expenditure and GDP
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004).
Analysis of ten years of panel data by Goodin et al. (1999)
showed that ‘there is no necessary trade-off between economic
efficiency and a generous welfare state’ (for a brief summary of
this study, see Headey et al. 2000). In other words, there do not
appear to be any strong grounds for arguing that higher social
expenditure would lead to negative economic outcomes. In
fact, the opposite has been shown to be the case in a number of
comparative studies. Social expenditure is not the zero-sum
game that it is often argued to be, but rather results in win-win
situations where expenditure is of benefit both to worse-off 
sections in society and to the society and economy as a while.
Moreover, less spending on social expenditure may mask the
fact that spending in other areas that effectively deal with the
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results of social exclusion is higher: for instance, some countries
with low levels of social expenditure have relatively large
prison populations and high law-enforcement costs
(Kilcommins et al. 2004).
It has to be borne in mind, however, that higher expenditure
in itself does not guarantee desirable outcomes. The institu-
tional structure of the welfare state, and the precise structure of
entitlements, can have a strong influence on both economic
impact and welfare outcomes (Atkinson 1999). For instance, the
United States spends a considerably larger proportion of its
GDP than any European country on health expenditure, yet the
highly unequal profile of this expenditure (a large share of
health expenditure in the US is private) is one of the reasons
behind the fact that health outcomes in the US are only average
or below average in many areas. 
Also, it is important to note that improved outcomes in some
areas are inevitably associated with long time-lags: in the area
of health, for instance, positive outcomes, e.g. increased life
expectancy, reduced mortality rate from various diseases and
reduced morbidity rates, can only be achieved and detected
after a considerable period of time has elapsed between
increased investment in the policy area and the measurement of
outcomes. Furthermore, outcomes in most policy areas are the
result of a large number of variables interacting over a long
period of time: good examples are health indicators that are
shaped by life style factors and overall levels of socio-econom-
ic development, in addition to health expenditure. 
Nonetheless, it would be foolish to dismiss recent significant
increases in some policy areas such as health and educational
disadvantage as ‘waste of money’: the long time-lags associat-
ed with these areas mean that assessment of progress is as yet
premature, and a large share of the added resources has been
absorbed by increases in salary costs, which is inevitable at a
time of rapidly rising salaries in other sectors of the economy. 
IRISH SOCIAL EXPENDITURE IN A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: EPILOGUE
12
4. Are current levels 
of social expenditure 
in Ireland ‘justified’ or
‘appropriate’?
It is often argued that due to its relatively young population
structure and low unemployment, Ireland does not ‘need’ to
spend as much as other European countries that suffer from
high unemployment and are burdened by their ageing popu-
lations.5 Whether this argument stands up to scrutiny is easily
established by examining expenditure in areas such as old age,
families and children, and unemployment, in the light of the
variables that can be interpreted as expressing ‘need’ for social
expenditure. In the case of demographics, we will see how
expenditure on old age relates to the old-age dependency ratio
and how expenditure on families and children relates to the
youth dependency ratio. In the case of employment, we will see
how expenditure on unemployment benefits relates to the level
of unemployment.
OLD AGE
Ireland has the second-lowest old-age dependency ratio in the
25-member EU6 (United Nations 2003). Does this justify the 
relatively low social expenditure level in Ireland? In order to
answer this question we will first look at the relationship in the
EU-15 countries between the old-age dependency ratio and old-
age expenditure (Figure 7). Generally speaking, countries with
higher old-age dependency ratios spend more on their older
population than countries with low dependency ratios. While
13
5 See for example an article by Mary Harney in the Irish Times 24 October
2003 (‘The PDs care about social justice, as recent facts and figures show’).
6 The old-age dependency ratio (i.e. number of persons 65 years old and
over per 100 persons aged 15-64 years) is marginally smaller in Slovakia.
Ireland does have a low old-age dependency ratio and low
social expenditure on its old-age population, it spends even less
than the Irish old-age dependency ratio would seem to suggest
(as indicated by its position below the regression line).
Figure 7: Old-age dependency and old-age expenditure, 2001
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004) and United Nations (2003).
FAMILIES AND CHILDREN
In contrast to its low old-age dependency ratio, Ireland has a
relatively high proportion of young people in the population.
This would seem to suggest that Ireland should spend more
than the other EU countries on social protection of children and
families. While the relationship between the youth dependency
ratio and expenditure on families and children (both measured
in PPS per capita) is not very strong, once again Ireland devi-
ates from the general trend by spending less than its youth
dependency ratio would seem to suggest. It is interesting to
note that while there is much variation among the EU coun-
tries, they can be roughly divided into high and low spenders
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on children and families, Ireland belonging to the latter group
despite its high youth dependency ratio.
Figure 8: Youth dependency ratio and expenditure on families
and children, 2001
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004) and United Nations (2003).
UNEMPLOYMENT
Figure 9 shows that at the chosen point in time (2001), there was
no significant correlation between the EU countries’ unemploy-
ment rates and their level of unemployment-related expendi-
ture. It appears, therefore, that expenditure in this particular
area is influenced by factors other than the level of unemploy-
ment. It is not possible to analyse the reasons for this within the
scope of this report, but it is likely that differences in national
definitions and practices in the area of unemployment policies
play an important role in fading away this intuitive connection.
Once again, however, unemployment-related expenditure is
lower in Ireland than in the EU countries on average.
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Figure 9: Unemployment rate and expenditure on 
unemployment, 2001
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004) and United Nations (2003).
INFRASTRUCTURE
It is sometimes argued that the extensive investment in infra-
structure that is currently needed in Ireland makes high social
expenditure impossible. It is certainly the case that Ireland is at
a catching-up stage in developing its infrastructure. Most other
wealthy European countries have made these investments in
infrastructure at an earlier stage, and are therefore in a position
to spend more on current expenditure, including social expen-
diture. However, it is also the case that social expenditure
would in many ways reinforce this expenditure on infrastruc-
ture, and that high levels of infrastructural spending do not
preclude the possibility of spending more on social protection
simultaneously, provided there is willingness to keep taxes at a
level that is capable of consistently sustaining both types of
expenditure.
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5. Summary of arguments
against higher social 
expenditure in Ireland
As the discussion above has shown, it is somewhat artificial to
examine social expenditure in the light of factors that could be
argued to ‘drive’ such expenditure. The graphs above show
that while expenditure in some areas, e.g. old-age expenditure,
appears to be quite strongly correlated with ‘objective needs’
for such expenditure, as measured crudely through old-age
dependency, no such strong relationship exists between other
key areas of expenditure and the social/economic realities that
could in principle influence expenditure (in the case of expen-
diture on children and families, there is only a very weak cor-
relation with youth dependency ratios, and the relationship
between unemployment rates and unemployment-related
expenditure is even weaker).
The short conclusion that we can draw from the discussion
above is that social expenditure, even within fairly narrowly
defined areas of expenditure, is influenced by several different
factors, and that capturing these factors is at best very compli-
cated and at worst impossible. ‘Politics’ is one possibly highly
significant factor; however, it is not possible to discuss it within
the scope of this report.
Despite these limitations and reservations regarding the use
of social and economic indicators to prescribe the ‘right’ levels
of social expenditure, it is nonetheless interesting to examine
the relationship between such indicators and expenditure. Also,
such an exercise provides an opportunity to respond to the
opponents of higher social expenditure who often base their
arguments on the lack of ‘objective’ grounds for higher expen-
diture. Taking into account a selection of key variables such as
share of the older and younger people in the population,
unemployment rate and national wealth, how ‘should’ Irish
17
social expenditure compare with average expenditure in the
EU? Comparisons with the EU averages are often criticised for
being ‘inappropriate’ because most other EU countries have
welfare states that are very different from Ireland’s, both struc-
turally and in terms of their basic aims. For this reason, Table 2
also contains a comparison with the UK which is arguably the
welfare state that has most in common with the Irish social pro-
tection system (‘most similar cases’). 
Table 2: Social expenditure and possible key determinants of
social expenditure in Ireland and the EU-15, 2001
Ireland EU-15 Ratio ‘Prescribed’ 
expenditure
(UK) Ireland in in Ireland7
relation to 
EU-15 (UK) 
Share of older 
population (65+) 11.2 16.6 0.67 1072.8
(15.1) (0.74) 
Unemployment 3.8 7.4 0.51 816.6
(5.0) (0.76) 
Share of young 30.8 23 1.34 2145.6
population (0-19) (25.3) (1.22) 
GDP per capita 27480 23340 1.18 1889.5
PPS (24530) (1.12) 
Social expenditure 3875.2 6404.9 0.61 5924.5
per capita PPS (actual) (actual) (0.63) (prescribed) 
6181 (UK) 
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004); European Commission/
Eurostat (2003a); European Commission/Eurostat (2003b).
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7 The ‘prescribed’ amounts are based on the hypothetical assumption that
each of the four key independent variables (old age population, young
population, wealth and unemployment) determine one quarter of total
expenditure.
Table 2 shows that the EU countries on average (and the UK)
have older populations and higher unemployment than
Ireland, factors that would seem to ‘necessitate’ higher social
expenditure in these countries. On the other hand, Ireland has
a higher proportion of young, and therefore mostly ‘dependent’,
people in its population, a factor that would seem to call for
higher expenditure. Ireland’s GDP is also considerably above
both the EU average and UK GDP, another factor that could be
interpreted as both enabling and necessitating above-average
social expenditure. 
If we want to summarise, very crudely, the joint impact of
these four variables, it seems that social expenditure in Ireland
‘should’ be 0.93 times the average expenditure for the EU-15,
and 0.96 times the UK social expenditure.8 In this sense, there-
fore, those who point to the lesser ‘need’ for social expenditure
in Ireland can feel vindicated, although the difference is only
very marginal; essentially it means that Ireland ‘should’ spend
7 per cent less than EU countries on average and 4 per cent less
than the UK. However, as the last row of this table indicates,
Ireland in fact spends 40 per cent less than the EU-15 on 
average on social protection, and 37 per cent less than the UK. 
In other words, there is a very substantial difference between
the level of social expenditure that the ‘objective realities’ of
Ireland’s social and economic profile would seem to call for and
the actual level of social protection in this country. The difference
between the actual and prescribed levels of social protection,
based on the EU average, is 2049 PPS, i.e. a 53 per cent increase
in Irish social expenditure would be necessary for it to reach the
level indicated by the four key variables.
Do the ‘outputs’ of Irish social protection policies, operating
on the basis of this relatively low level of investment in social
protection, indicate that low social expenditure is in fact yield-
ing the poor results that we would expect? We will now turn to
IRISH SOCIAL EXPENDITURE IN A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: EPILOGUE
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8 This ratio is calculated by taking the average of the four ratios (old age
population, youth population, unemployment and GDP) in Table 2.
analysing some key indicators of the effectiveness of social
expenditure, namely levels of poverty and inequality that 
pertain in Ireland and other countries.
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6. Does higher social 
expenditure always 
result in more positive
social outcomes?
This section discusses briefly inequality in Ireland in comparison
with other European countries. In the light of the discussion
above, it comes as no surprise that the outcomes of the 
Irish redistributive system are rather poor, as evidenced in com-
paratively high levels of inequality.
Figure 10: Social expenditure and post-transfer poverty (60% of
median)
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004).
There is a well-established and straightforward relationship
between social expenditure and poverty: countries that spend
more tend to enjoy lower levels of poverty, and vice versa
(Cantillon, Marx and van den Bosch 2002). Figure 10 shows that
21
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Ireland belongs to the cluster of EU countries, also comprising
Spain, Portugal and Greece, that have highest poverty rates (in
the light of the 60 per cent of median income definition of
poverty). All EU countries that invest more in social protection
are consistently achieving lower rates of poverty than this high-
poverty cluster that Ireland belongs to. 
The fact that there is a strong correlation between total social
spending and income inequality does not mean that a similarly
strong correlation can be found between all areas of expendi-
ture and related social outcomes. For instance, as we have seen
above, there does not appear to be any connection between
unemployment-related social expenditure and unemployment
rates: this is partly because the statistics on unemployment-
related expenditure for a large number of countries fail to cap-
ture the many different kinds of employment/unemployment
supports in operation in different countries, and partly because
unemployment rates are a result of the interaction of a very
large number of social and economic influences, of which social
expenditure is only one.
Nonetheless, the correlation between social spending and
inequality is very strong, indicating that social expenditure
does influence the degree of income inequality in a society,
although a number of other factors, such as (in)equality 
of earned incomes clearly play a role in shaping the final distri-
bution of incomes also. Measuring the proportion of the 
population falling below the 60 per cent poverty line is only one
of several different ways of measuring poverty/inequality.
However, Ireland’s comparative position with respect to levels
of inequality is extremely unfavourable in the light of all major
internationally applied indicators of poverty and inequality.9
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9 It has to be acknowledged that, in the light of the so-called consistent
poverty indicator, poverty levels in Ireland have decreased significantly
over the last 10 years (see e.g. Layte, Nolan and Whelan 2004). However,
this indicator is not commonly applied in international comparisons and
Ireland is one of the very few countries where this indicator is used to
monitor poverty levels. Policymaking in most other EU countries is
informed by relative income poverty indicators.
The ratio of income held by the top quartile of the population
to the income held by the bottom quartile is another common
indicator of overall income inequality; a higher ratio indicates
greater inequality – see Figure 11. In the light of this indicator
Ireland is, together with the UK, the most unequal country in
the EU-25. The ratio in Ireland is 6.4 in contrast to the
unweighted EU average of 3.7 (Russell and Whelan 2004: 6). 
Figure 11: Inequality: ratio of highest and lowest incomes (total
incomes of bottom and top quartiles
Source: Russell and Whelan (2004).
Figures 12 and 13 show that Ireland has the highest pre- and
post-transfer poverty rates among the EU-15. The transfer 
system in Ireland is able to reduce income inequality, but it is
operating in a context where pre-transfer incomes are more
unequal than elsewhere in the EU, and the relatively modest
scope of social policy, as evidenced by relatively low levels 
of social expenditure, also means that the extent of poverty-
reduction is more limited.
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Figure 12: Pre-transfer poverty, 2001
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004).
Figure 13: Post-transfer poverty, 2001
Source: European Commission/Eurostat (2004).
It is also important to acknowledge that income poverty is not
evenly distributed across the population, but rather tends to
affect some groups more than others. Perhaps most worryingly,
Ireland belongs to the group of rich English-speaking countries
that are characterised by high child-poverty levels
IRISH SOCIAL EXPENDITURE IN A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: EPILOGUE
24
Ireland
UK
Sweden
Portugal
France
Spain
Greece
Belgium
Austria
Italy
Netherlands
Germany
Denmark
Finland
25 3515 201050 30
Ireland
Portugal
Greece
Italy
Spain
UK
France
Belgium
Austria
Finland
Netherlands
Germany
Denmark
Sweden
2515 201050
(Micklewright 2004). Considering that overall poverty levels
and child poverty levels have been shown to be very strongly
positively correlated (Brady 2004), this comes as no surprise.
Other groups that research in Ireland has identified as particu-
larly at risk include older women, single-person households,
lone parent households and households where nobody is in
paid employment (Whelan et al. 2003).
Perhaps even more worryingly, it appears that the depth and
duration of poverty have increased in Ireland. A study by
Whelan et al. (2003) of income inequality in Ireland between
1994 and 2001 states that this ‘gap between the poor and the
non-poor has increased steadily and substantially over time’. In
other words, the ‘depth’ of poverty has increased. Many would
argue that short-term poverty is unpleasant but not particularly
harmful. However, medium and long-term poverty clearly
result in distress, abandonment of many habitual leisure 
pursuits and even social contacts, inability to save and invest,
running down of basic assets and so on. The rate of persistent
poverty10 has also increased in Ireland, indicating that more
individuals are finding it harder to achieve income levels that
would bring them above the relative poverty line. In 2001,
Ireland had the third-highest level of persistent poverty among
the EU-15, Greece and Portugal having a marginally higher rate. 
Subjective perceptions of Irish people also appear to confirm
that feelings of social exclusion are more prevalent in this 
country than in most other EU countries, and that adverse
socio-economic circumstances increase these feelings of social
exclusion. Non-skilled individuals, the unemployed and those
with lower levels of education are considerably more likely
than the employed and those with high levels of education and
belonging to the professional class to perceive themselves to be
socially excluded (Böhnke 2004).
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10 The share of persons with equivalised disposable income below the risk-
of-poverty threshold in the current year and in at least two of the preced-
ing three years. The threshold is set at 60 per cent of the national median
equivalised disposable income.
7.Policy recommendations
Policy proposals and policy making should ideally be based on
solid evidence. What kind of policy recommendations emerge
from the evidence presented above and from other evidence that
is available on the structure and problems of Irish social policy?
There is plentiful and undisputable evidence of the following: 
• Income distribution is comparatively unequal in Ireland.
• Ireland spends a modest share of its wealth on social pro-
tection in comparison with most other EU countries, or
indeed most other advanced industrialised countries.
While there is no straightforward or automatic causal relation-
ship between these two facts, it is nonetheless likely that certain
social and economic reforms would help to bring about more
equal income distribution and more equal access to social and
health services in Ireland. As the original social expenditure
report pointed out, whether this is deemed a desirable policy
objective is always in the final analysis a political decision. The
importance that is attributed to achieving more equal distribu-
tion of incomes in Ireland is the central factor that determines
the direction of spending (and, by extension, taxation) policies
in Ireland. 
Given the limited scope of this document, it is clearly not
possible to provide a detailed blueprint for future reforms of
Irish social expenditure, i.e. the entire social policy structure of
the country. The tentative recommendations put forward here
focus on a limited number of broad policy and expenditure
areas that are deemed to be in particularly urgent need of atten-
tion and reform. The key features of the Irish social expenditure
and social policy system that underlie these recommendations
are the following:11
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11 Due to limitations on the length of this report, it is not possible to elaborate
on these in detail. However, the report contains a brief discussion on some
of these features and references to more detailed studies are provided in
the footnotes.
• The high share of means-tested benefits in total social
expenditure12
• The relatively marginal role of social insurance13
• Tax-financing14
• The importance of informal (unpaid) care provided by 
family members to children, older people and people with
disabilities and the relatively limited role of the state in
providing/financing these services (see Table 3 below)
• High income inequality (see Figures 11, 12 and 13 above)
• Low but increasing share of older people in the population
• Rapidly increased female labour force participation, but 
significant drop in employment level for women with two
or more children, reflecting, among other things, poor
childcare supports15
• Relatively low unemployment, but many ‘working poor’16
• Very low employment rates for people with disabilities17
• Strong influence of socio-economic class on many social
indicators such as mortality, morbidity and access to third-
level education
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12 Means-tested benefits constitute an extremely high share of overall social
expenditure in Ireland. Whereas the EU-15 countries spend on average
less than 10 per cent of their social expenditure on means-tested benefits,
these benefits amount to just over one-quarter of social expenditure in
Ireland (European Commission/Eurostat 2004).
13 See for instance McCashin (2004). The fact that social insurance benefits in
Ireland are effectively flat-rate and capped at a very low level is one of the
main contributory factors behind the weak attachment of middle- and
high-income earners to the social protection system in Ireland.
14 In 2001, general government contributions (tax financing) covered nearly
60 per cent of all public social expenditure in Ireland, in contrast to the
EU-15 average of 36 per cent. Conversely, the share of employee and
employer contributions in financing social expenditure in Ireland is
among the lowest in the EU.
15 Whereas the average OECD employment rate for 25 to 54-year-old women
with two or more children was 61.9 per cent in 2000, the labour market
participation rate for women in this group in Ireland was only 40.8 per
cent (OECD 2003a: 37). 
16 In 2001, nearly one-quarter of those on less than 50 per cent of average
income in Ireland were employed or self-employed (CORI 2004).
17 The very low relative employment rates of disabled to non-disabled per-
sons in Ireland are highlighted in OECD 2003a: 39.
The recommendations put forward here focus on four areas:
• Employment-focused policy
• Income security for those not in employment
• Service expenditure
• Tax expenditure.
EMPLOYMENT-FOCUSED POLICY
It is generally acknowledged that ‘the most disadvantaged per-
sons are … those with poor education, low-skill employment,
and a high exposure to unemployment’ (Alber and Köhler 2004:
51). In other words, the ‘traditional’ forms of inequality based
on income, education and employment remain the most 
pervasive and persistent ones. Enabling people to access
employment and to progress on their chosen career paths
through (lifelong) education and training and supporting the
incomes of low earners are keys to addressing these traditional
forms of inequality.
The overriding priority of the Irish government policies at
the moment is creating and sustaining a high level of employ-
ment (see e.g. Office for Social Inclusion 2003). Many experts
and international organisations such as the OECD would agree
that this is the correct priority. EU member states have agreed
that raising the employment rate to 70 per cent of the working
age population is their common central aspiration. The employ-
ment rate in Ireland is currently very close to the EU average
(approximately 65 per cent in 2003).
Extensive consensus therefore exists both in Ireland and
other countries that employment is a key mechanism of social
integration and poverty reduction, and that unemployment is
to be fought as one of the key contributors to poverty and social
exclusion. However, ensuring high employment levels does not
automatically eradicate poverty or social exclusion. Alongside
other liberal welfare states, Ireland is affected by the ‘working
poor’ phenomenon. This refers to a group of people who,
despite being in employment, suffer from poverty. Nearly 20
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per cent of the people falling into the ‘consistently poor’ cate-
gory in Ireland are in employment. The proportion of house-
holds where the reference person is employed falling under the
60 per cent poverty line increased from 2.6 per cent in 1998 to
8.1 per cent in 2001 (Office for Social Inclusion 2003, p. 4). This
indicates that income support mechanisms for low-income
workers need to be enhanced and their take-up encouraged.
There is widespread agreement of the following among policy
makers and analysts in developed welfare states, including the
liberal ones such as the UK and the US:
• Some groups need more help than others to gain a foothold
in the labour market and to remain in employment. Two
types of services are of crucial importance, namely child
care and training/employment services. While Ireland has a
reasonably good track record in the area of active labour
market policies, much more can be done in this area. With
regard to childcare, the availability in Ireland of these 
services to low- and middle-income workers, and to lone
parents in particular, is very poor.
• Non-market mechanisms are needed to enhance the earned
incomes of some groups in order to prevent the emergence
of ‘the working poor’, i.e. individuals and families that
work full-time but cannot reach the poverty threshold.
Another important motivation for these policies is the 
elimination of so-called poverty traps or disincentives to
work, i.e. situations where income from benefits and sup-
ports exceeds the low incomes that can be earned on the
labour market. 
Due to the focus on the relatively low unemployment rates in
Ireland in recent years, there has been a tendency to pay insuf-
ficient attention to the working poor, those in atypical employ-
ment18 and those who find it difficult to progress to better paid
employment. Increased resources should be devoted to
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18 See Gash (2004).
enabling adults to undertake further study and training and to
helping disadvantaged groups such as people with disabilities
and lone parents to access the labour market (e.g. Gannon and
Nolan 2004, Martin and Grubb 2001). Many liberal welfare
states have embraced the principle of boosting low incomes
from work: the most important examples here are the Earned
Income Tax Credit in the US and the Working Families Tax
Credit in the UK. 
While the Family Income Supplement (FIS) programme in
Ireland does to some extent serve a similar purpose, it is not as
comprehensive and extensive as the systems in the US and the
UK.19 For instance, in 2003 there were only some 7,000 recipi-
ents of the Back to Work Allowance and only some 12,000 fam-
ilies received the Family Income Supplement in Ireland. The
majority of Family Income Supplement recipients were given a
payment amounting to less than A75 per week (Department of
Social and Family Affairs 2003). There clearly is much scope
both for expanding the availability and take-up of this kind of
programme and for making such programmes more closely
related to living costs and average incomes.
INCOME SECURITY FOR THOSE OUTSIDE THE LABOUR FORCE
In the Irish context, work-poor households are particularly
prevalent among older people (55-64), lone parents, people
with a disability or a chronic health problem, those with no
qualifications and those with a history of unskilled work
(Russell et al. 2004). While efforts to integrate these groups into
the labour market are necessary and desirable, it also has to be
acknowledged that, for a variety of reasons, at any given time,
there are individuals who are outside the labour force tem-
porarily or permanently. Because ‘poverty trends are directly
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19 These tax-credit based systems of income supplementation obviously suf-
fer from a number of limitations and difficulties, but their very existence
does reflect a concern, however modest, with the phenomenon of the
‘working poor’. Evaluating the potential usefulness of these programmes
in the Irish context would form the topic of an interesting future study.
related to the level and quality of employment and to the systems
of income support for those who cannot work or are retired’ (Office
for Social Inclusion 2003, p. 3), increasing employment levels
can never result in the elimination of inequality: improvements
in transfers are required, too.
All social policies are based on implicit or explicit beliefs
about the purpose of benefits and services. In many countries,
the aim of social policies is to bring about equality in the form
of relatively small post-tax, post-transfer income differentials.
Other countries put less emphasis on equality and limit their
aspirations to preventing the emergence of the most extreme
forms of poverty and deprivation that would manifest them-
selves in, for example, inability to purchase adequate foodstuffs,
to afford the bare minimum of clothing, to be able to live in
warm accommodation etc.
If a modest degree of poverty alleviation mainly through
means-tested benefits is the chosen path in the future in Ireland,
no major reforms are needed. As was illustrated above, the
post-tax, post-transfer poverty rate in Ireland is lower than the
pre-tax, pre-transfer poverty rate: the tax and redistribution
policies in this country are therefore accomplishing the aim of
reducing inequality, although they still produce poverty levels
that are higher than in the other EU-15. The means-tested and
relatively low flat-rate benefits are therefore going some way
towards alleviating the more extreme forms of poverty (‘con-
sistent poverty’ and the proportion falling below the 40 per cent
poverty line). Most evidence indicates that current social policy
making in Ireland restricts its ambition to preventing consistent
poverty measured with the help of a combined deprivation and
relative income poverty indicator (Office for Social Inclusion
2003, p. 23). However, were Ireland to adopt more ambitious
aims regarding the eradication or prevention of relative poverty,
radical changes in policy would be necessary.
There is extensive economic and social policy literature on the
effectiveness of different types of social protection mechanisms
in reducing poverty and inequality. While some have argued
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that targeted (means-tested) measures are the best approach to
reducing poverty/inequality (e.g. Le Grand 1982), others have
provided evidence that a universalist approach, with an
emphasis on social insurance and universal benefits, is more
successful in achieving more equal income distribution (e.g.
Korpi and Palme 1998). Recent evidence indicates that welfare
states with a greater emphasis on encompassing non-targeted
policies are more successful than liberal welfare states that have
a very minimalist, targeted emphasis (Nelson 2004a and 2004b).
However, it has to be acknowledged that income distribution is
influenced by factors other than social policy such as the
inequality of earned incomes (pre-tax, pre-transfer incomes),
the level and average duration of unemployment, and so on. 
According to Nelson, ‘the pooling of risks and resources
across socio-economically heterogeneous population groups
within [social insurance schemes] creates certain conditions for
an effective alleviation of poverty … the introduction of social
transfer programmes responding to the demand for income
security among middle- and higher-income groups helps to
promote generous social benefits to citizens in lower income
segments … the higher the degree of income security in social
insurance is, the higher the level of social benefits provided to
individuals in the lower tail of the income distribution tends to
be’ (2004a: 31). As many of the individuals affected by income
poverty in Ireland are dependent on benefits as their main or
only source of income, the relatively low level of these benefits
is clearly the reason for the fact that these individuals are living
in poverty. Closer linking of benefits incomes to incomes
earned from work is needed if benefit recipients’ incomes are
not to fall below the poverty line. In the balance between
means-tested and social insurance/universal benefits, a shift is
therefore required towards the latter, together with closer link-
ing of social insurance to earned incomes.
The high levels of income inequality in Ireland are first and
foremost the result of an increase in the gap between the incomes
of those in employment and those on benefits and pensions
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(Whelan et al. 2003). In order to reduce inequality in Ireland,
this gap would have to be narrowed. It is questionable whether
relative poverty can be successfully and consistently prevented
in systems that rely strongly on means-tested and non-indexed
flat-rate payments, such as the Irish social security benefits. A
basic prerequisite for attempting to prevent relative poverty
among those outside the labour force would be linking benefits
and payments to prices and wages.20 This would ensure that
those deriving their incomes from benefits would keep up with
wage earners and not fall behind in income distribution, as has
happened in Ireland.21 While all benefit incomes should be
adjusted to ensure they keep up with increases in incomes from
work, the incomes of groups such as lone parents and older
people are a particularly urgent priority as these groups suffer
disproportionately from income poverty. 
SERVICE EXPENDITURE
The area of health and social services is obviously too complex
to make any in-depth policy recommendations in the context of
a short report. However, it is clear that Irish spending on social
services in particular falls significantly below spending in most
other EU and even OECD countries. Table 3 shows that expen-
diture on services for families, older people and people with
disabilities is at a particularly low level in Ireland in relation to
the average share of national wealth devoted to these services
in the OECD countries.
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20 Some commitments have been made to linking benefits to incomes, for
instance in the National Pensions Policy Initiative (1998), which aims at
bringing the Contributory Old-Age Pension to 34 per cent of average
industrial earnings.
21 Work disincentives need not result from such a strategy, provided that
receiving benefits is strictly conditional on willingness to work and re-
train where necessary.
Table 3: Categories of Irish social expenditure, 1980-1998 (per-
centage of GDP) and percentage of the OECD average in 1998
1980 1990 1998 % of OECD 
average 
Old age cash benefits 4.02 3.72 2.54 35 
Disability cash benefits 0.52 0.78 0.74 50 
Services for older 
people and people 
with disabilities 0.51 0.44 0.36 43 
Family cash benefits 1.02 1.59 1.58 120 
Family services 0.05 0.04 0.16 29 
Active labour market 
policies .. 1.38 1.16 173 
Unemployment cash 
benefits .. 2.58 1.72 131 
Health care 6.84 4.82 4.66 82 
Source: OECD (1998).
Increasing social expenditure without regard to structural 
considerations is not always sufficient to attain desirable policy
aims. This is all the more the case in the area of services, where
much of increased expenditure can be absorbed through vari-
ous types of cost inflation and through catching-up in terms of
basic infrastructure. While health spending has increased very
rapidly over the last years, several indicators point to the poor
and unequal health outcomes in Ireland (Wren 2003). In other
words, increased spending per se does not appear to be deliver-
ing an effective and equitable health care system. 
The reasons for this are many and complex, but some 
international guidelines are available on the kind of investment
priorities and innovations that are demonstrably effective in
increasing productivity and quality of health care (OECD 2004).
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However, the fact that Irish people are considerably less satis-
fied with their health care systems than citizens of the EU15/25
member states would appear to provide an endorsement of pro-
found reform activity in this area (Alber and Köhler 2004: 41). 
Among the most urgent issues are inequitable access to
health care and the high cost of primary health care in relation
to the lowest incomes among groups without a Medical Card
entitlement. Extending Medical Card entitlement to cover more
low-income households, particularly households with children,
should be a key priority area. It is also clear that as private med-
ical insurance in Ireland operates within a highly imperfect
market structure, it has not contributed to a more cost-effective
provision of health care and its role should therefore be
reviewed and reconsidered as a matter of urgency (see
Colombo and Tapay 2004).
There are many reasons why investing more in ‘social’ serv-
ices is an urgent priority in Ireland (see also NESC 2003 for a
more comprehensive treatment of this area). Social services is a
very broad concept that embraces many different areas such as
integration policies for immigrants, transport policy, housing
policy and care services for children and older people. There is
plentiful evidence of the unequal outcomes in health, education
and housing that result partly from the lack of adequate public
investment or misdirection of resources (for educational dis-
advantage see McCoy and Smyth 2003, for health inequalities
see Wren 2003, for housing inequality see Fahey et al. 2004). 
The possibly declining ability and/or willingness of families,
and women in particular, to carry heavy informal care 
workloads should also act as a catalyst both to improving care
services for children, people with disabilities and older people,
and to developing employment rights and social entitlements
that enable the combination of, or alternation between, paid
work and informal care giving. Informal care work poses a 
significant poverty risk on carers, and this group is therefore in
need of both improved income transfers and greater opportu-
nities for combining work and care duties. Recent research has
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established that female labour force participation reduces over-
all, old age and child poverty levels, and that investment in care
services that help women to undertake paid employment out-
side the home constitutes one part of an effective anti-poverty
policy (Brady 2004; Büchel, Mertens and Orsini 2003). The
OECD has highlighted the shortage of appropriate childcare
and made a very clear case for increased public investment in
childcare in Ireland (OECD 2003b). It has pointed out the
numerous benefits of childcare and early childhood education
services for children’s cognitive abilities, mothers’ employment
opportunities and the economy as a whole.
The question of universal vs. means-tested entitlements is
also relevant in the area of services. In some areas, e.g. public
childcare services that are targeted to very low-income parents,
the criteria for receiving services is strongly based on inability
to pay for market-priced services. In other areas, e.g. health
care, the ability to take out private insurance or to contract 
private providers can significantly influence access to and qual-
ity of services obtained. In other areas still, e.g. some supports
for older people, small-scale service programmes are emerging
that include only very limited means-testing, if any. In other
words, there is great diversity in the basis of entitlement to 
various services. 
As a general rule, access to services should be increasingly
based on demonstrated need for help, care and assistance, and
the criteria for any contribution that the service user has to
make should be clear and uniform across the country. While the
mixing of public and private (insurance and out-of-pocket)
financing in the service sector, and health care in particular, has
become a firmly entrenched feature of the Irish welfare state,
the fact that ‘private’ services are often partially publicly
financed should be openly acknowledged; the extent of such
public funding of privileged access to services should be 
estimated; and the full cost of this privileged access to services
should be borne by those who avail of them or otherwise 
benefit from them.
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TAX EXPENDITURE
The extent and impact of tax expenditures in the Irish tax and
welfare system should be thoroughly assessed. Available data
indicate that, in 2002, nearly A1.3 billion in revenue was fore-
gone through tax exemptions on private pensions. The ‘cost’ of
mortgage interest relief and other loans relating to housing was
over A200 million in foregone revenue. Tax expenditure on 
private health insurance was approaching A90 million (Office of
the Revenue Commissioners 2003, p. 63). 
Defenders of tax expenditure are correct when they point out
that some of these allowances are enjoyed by considerable
numbers of people in Ireland. For instance, some 450,000 indi-
viduals and households enjoy tax relief in respect of private
medical insurance, and mortgage tax relief benefits over
400,000 households. However, the proponents of tax breaks
rarely highlight the fact that better-off individuals and house-
holds derive considerably greater monetary value from such
tax breaks. For instance, while only some 18 per cent of those
who receive tax breaks in respect of private medical insurance
have incomes in excess of A60,000, their share of the total tax
expenditure in this area is nearly 28 per cent, in contrast to the
12 per cent of households with incomes below A17,500 whose
share of total tax expenditure is around 7 per cent. 
In the case of mortgage interest relief, the wealthiest 17 per
cent of those receiving the tax break garner 23 per cent of the
total value of the tax break (Office of the Revenue
Commissioners 2003, pp. 89 and 91). In the case of tax breaks
for private pensions, the skewed redistribution where those on
highest incomes derive the greatest benefit from the scheme is
even more evident (Hughes 2001, Hughes and Stewart 2004).
This pattern of tax expenditures flowing overwhelmingly to 
citizens with above-average incomes has been confirmed by
several studies (e.g. Howard 1997), and it is expected that, in
the absence of very careful planning and targeting, any addi-
tional tax breaks and increases in tax breaks in Ireland would
most likely have a regressive redistributive effect. 
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The total extent of tax breaks for social purposes, and their
redistributive profile, should be made clear and public. This
should be followed by an open debate regarding the fairness of
such tax breaks. Tax expenditure on private pensions which
disproportionately benefits the better-off now exceeds expendi-
ture on non-contributory state pensions which typically go to
the worst-off pensioners. This is a choice that is very difficult 
to justify in terms of fairness, and calls for a fundamental re-
think of tax expenditure policies and, more specifically, of 
pensions policy.
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8. Conclusion
This report has confirmed that, despite dramatic growth in real
terms, Irish social expenditure remains low by comparison to
most of the EU-15, even when factors such as the low propor-
tion of older people in the population are taken into account.
Comparative data show that there is a strong correlation
between social expenditure and income inequality: the higher
spending countries tend to have lower levels of inequality. 
Comparative research has also shown that competitiveness
and high employment levels are not irreconcilable with higher
social expenditure and greater income equality. In fact, higher
social expenditure can not only help to bring about lower 
levels of income inequality but can also contribute to positive
economic outcomes, and is certainly not inimical to these, as the
example of many other wealthy countries shows. 
It is clearly not possible to provide a blueprint for the reform
of the entire Irish social protection system within the scope of
this short report. However, a number of reforms have been sug-
gested here, including:
• increased service expenditure
• reduced tax expenditure
• greater efforts to integrate excluded groups into the labour
force
• mechanisms for increasing low incomes from work
• mechanisms for linking benefit incomes to earned incomes. 
These reforms are justifiable on the grounds that they would
make a significant contribution to the incomes and welfare of
individuals and families that are currently on relatively low
incomes, in particularly difficult labour market situations, or
extremely pressurised due to work and family obligations. 
This report has not argued that increased social expenditure
will automatically, and in isolation from all other factors, result
in more positive social outcomes: rather, it calls for more careful
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policy planning that takes into account the redistributive out-
comes of different policy instruments, and gives greater priority
to addressing both income inequality and the inequalities in
access to services and employment that many people in Ireland
still suffer from.
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Title of report: Irish Social Expenditure in a Comparative
International Context: Epilogue
Researcher: Dr Virpi Timonen, Trinity College, Dublin
DESCRIPTION OF WORK
The purpose of this report is to present the most up-to-date
comparative data available on social expenditure in Ireland and
selected EU/OECD countries. Other EU countries will serve as
the main point of comparison to Irish social expenditure, pre-
sented both in percentage of GDP terms and in Purchasing
Power Standards terms.
In addition to containing the most up-to-date social expendi-
ture data, the report will contain other relevant data such as
measures of poverty and inequality in the countries analysed.
These data will be used to back up the policy recommendations
that are included in the last section of the report.
The report will in particular attempt to address the views and
criticisms presented in various political responses to the publi-
cation of the original report.
The report will also contain a substantial discussion of 
possible structural reforms of Irish social expenditure that
could be undertaken with the view to bringing about greater
equality of incomes and opportunities. The discussion of policy
options will focus on the particular merits of service expendi-
ture vis-à-vis transfer expenditure; the central importance of
investing in good career opportunities for all population groups,
particularly women who are currently marginalised in terms of
their labour market opportunities; and the role that tax expen-
diture continues to play in absorbing resources that could be
used to pay for more universal services. 
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